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Prayers for Our Protection and Prosperity
at Court: Shakers,
Children, and the Law,
Barbara Taback Schneider*
INTRODUCTION
At the top of Prospect Hill in Harvard, Massachusetts, are the
Fruitlands Museums, founded in 1914 by Clara Endicott Sears, a
wealthy Bostonian who summered in Harvard. She befriended the last
members of the Shaker communities of Harvard and Shirley that formed
the Harvard Bishopric of the United Believers of Christ, and chronicled
their histories.2 Miss Sears structured the Museum around the farm-
house in which Bronson Alcott and his family lived in a communistic
experiment from June 1843 to January 1844. 3 She later added a Shaker
building, an art gallery of early American itinerant portraits and Hudson
River School landscapes, and a gallery devoted to the American Indian.
As Miss Sears intended,4 the eclectic collection of the Museums forces
the visitor to connect different aspects of the past, and the past with the
present.
* I thank William W. Fisher III, Martha Minow, E. Chouteau Merrill, Jane S. Catler, the
reference librarians at Harvard Law School, and the volunteers and the staff of the Fruitlands
Museums for their guidance, help, and criticism.
1. This title is adapted from an entry found in the Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, July 30, 1843.
Elder Grove's entry on the evening before the Shakers of Harvard, Massachusetts, appeared in court
to defend against a writ of habeas corpus noted that the community engaged in "[p]rayers... at
home for our protection and prosperity at Court." All of the journals referred to in this paper are
held by the Fruitlands Museums.
2. See EDWARD HORGAN, THE SHAKER HOLY LAND 150-51, 157-58 (1987).
3. See id. at 80-93. Bronson Alcott was a New England Transcendentalist who started the
Temple School in Boston in 1834. The school was designed to revolutionize the education of
children by "teaching them how to examine themselves, and to discriminate their animal and
spiritual natures, their outward and inward life; and also how the inward moulds the outward."
Elizabeth Peabody, Record of a School: Exemplifying the General Principles of Spiritual Culture, in
THE REFORM IMPULSE, 1825-1850 132 (W. Huggins ed., 1972); see also Priscilla Brewer, Emerson,
Lane, and the Shakers: A Case of Converging Ideologies, 15 NEW ENG. Q. 254 (1982) (examining the
relationship between the Transcendentalists of Concord and the Shakers of Harvard and Shirley)
[hereinafter Brewer, Emerson. Lane, and the Shakers].
4. The Fruitlands Museums' descriptive brochure notes that Miss Sears "wished to preserve not
only objects and artifacts, but an appreciation of the diverse spiritual forces that helped shape our
country."
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This paper is my modest effort to make the same sort of connections
through an examination of one aspect of the Shakers' lives: the method
by which they obtained and retained children who came to Shaker com-
munities without their parents. Because Shaker theology required that
community members subscribe to a creed of celibacy, new members
could only come from outside a community's boundaries. When adults
joined a community, they signed a covenant and "consecrated themselves
and their property to God."6 When these relationships crumbled, courts
were faced with the broken pieces. For example, could a man who had
signed a community's covenant, in which he acknowledged that his work
would be for the good of all, recover wages if he left?7 When families, or
only portions of them, joined the Shakers, different legal questions were
posed. Did a woman have grounds for obtaining a divorce if her hus-
band joined the Shakers?' The way that courts dealt with these issues
has received some analysis by scholars of legal and Shaker history.9
Existing histories have not, however, undertaken a detailed analysis of
the Shaker practice of recruiting followers by accepting and retaining
custody of children, although most acknowledge that the practice was an
important component of Shaker life.1t Nor have they focused on the
5. HENRI DESROCHE, THE AMERICAN SHAKERS: FROM NEO-CHRISTIANITY TO PRESOCIALISM
139 (J. Savacool trans., 1971).
6. EDWARD ANDREWS, THE COMMUNITY INDUSTRIES OF THE SHAKERS 12 (1932) [hereinafter
ANDREWS, COMMUNITY INDUSTRIES].
7. See, e.g., Waite v. Merrill, 4 Me. (4 Greenl.) 102 (1826) (upholding the validity of the
covenant of the Shaker Society of Sabbathday Lake, Maine, against a claim by an apostate member
for wages).
8. See. e.g., Fitts v. Fitts, 46 N.H. 184 (1865) (granting a divorce to a man from his Shaker wife
based on a statutory provision that created grounds for a divorce if one spouse joined a sect that did
not believe in matrimonial cohabitation); Dyer v. Dyer, 5 N.H. 271 (1830) (granting a divorce to a
woman from her Shaker husband based on an earlier version of the same statute).
9. The most notable book to date is by Professor Carol Weisbrod of the University of
Connecticut Law School. Her book, The Boundaries of Utopia, focuses on the lawsuits brought by
first- and second-generation apostates from Shaker and other nineteenth-century utopian
communities to challenge the covenants through which they gave their property and bound
themselves to work for the good of the community without wages. Professor Weisbrod uses these
contracts to illustrate the operation of freedom of contract in the nineteenth century. See CAROL
WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA xi-xxii (1980) [hereinafter WEISBROD, BOUNDARIES].
Other works have described the types of legal disputes that engaged the Shakers. See, e.g.,
EDWARD ANDREWS, WORK AND WORSHIP: THE ECONOMIC ORDER OF THE SHAKERS 162-86
(1974) (describing cases and legislative enactments pertaining to military service, custody of children
where one parent was a community member and the other was not, the validity of the Shaker
covenant, and the extent of Shaker landholdings) [hereinafter ANDREWS, WORK AND WORSHIP]; 2
MARY RICHMOND, SHAKER LITERATURE: A BIBLIOGRAPHY 249-53 (listing a representative, but
incomplete, sample of reported state and federal court decisions involving Shakers, but noting that
Shakers were probably involved in many more disputes that were settled or unreported); Ralph
Stein, A Sect Apart.- A History of the Legal Troubles of the Shakers, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 751 (1981)
(positing that "the Shakers' conflict with the legal system may not, in all likelihood, have made
much difference to the Shakers themselves").
10. See, e.g., ANDREWS, COMMUNITY INDUSTRIES, supra note 6, at 31; ANDREWS, WORK AND
WORSHIP, supra note 9, at 30-31. For the Shakers' own account of the importance of children, see
CALVIN GREEN & SETH WELLS, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE MILLENNIAL CHURCH, OR UNITED
SOCIETY OF BELIEVERS, COMMONLY CALLED SHAKERS 65, 71-75 (rev. ed. 1848).
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legal relationships within a particular Shaker community.II When indi-
vidual children "went to the Shakers," they did so in circumstances that
were different from those of adults who went alone or with their families,
which gave rise to unique legal issues when their status was in dispute.
Some were indentured by parents who wanted their children to learn a
trade 2 or by the local overseers of the poor with formal agreements for
the same purpose. 13 Others were left informally with a community,
either by parents for brief periods while family fortunes ebbed, 4 or by
overseers who placed children to act as temporary servants.' 5 Many
young runaways and orphans came on their own.' 6
Children also left Shaker communities for a number of reasons and in
different circumstances than did adults. Some were deemed unsuited for
the simple rigors of daily life and were returned to their families or to the
institutions from which they came."' Other children ran away.'" In
many cases, the Shakers seemed willing to allow the children to leave."
11. See WEISBROD, BOUNDARIES, supra note 9, at 35 n.2. This is not to say that there are no
detailed histories of particular communities. See, e.g., HORGAN, supra note 2 (focusing on Harvard
and Shirley); Priscilla Brewer, The Demographic Features of Shaker Decline, 1787-1900, 15 J.
INTERDISCIPLINARY HIsT. 31 (1984) (focusing on the Church Family of Mount Lebanon, New
York) [hereinafter Brewer, Demographic Features].
12. See JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS:
EMBRACING HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, INFANCY, AND
MASTER AND SERVANT 368 n.4 (5th ed. 1895); see also Indenture of Lydia Merriner, 1816 (signed
by her father); Indenture of Nathanael Saunders, 1816 (signed by his mother) (on file at the archives
of the Shaker Library in Sabbathday Lake, Maine). Parents also executed agreements to indenture
their children when the entire family joined a Shaker community. See DAVID LAMSON, Two
YEARS' EXPERIENCE AMONG THE SHAKERS: BEING A DESCRIPTION OF THE MANNERS AND
CUSTOMS OF THAT PEOPLE, THE NATURE AND POLICY OF THEIR GOVERNMENT, THEIR
MARVELLOUS INTERCOURSE WITH THE SPIRITUAL WORLD, THE OBJEcr AND USES OF
CONFESSION, THEIR INQUISITION, IN SHORT, A CONDENSED VIEW OF SHAKERISM As IT is 177-84
(describing an indenture agreement that bound the children of a member 'of one family within the
Hancock, Massachusetts community to another family).
13. See, e.g., Dyer v. Hunt, 5 N.H. 401 (1831). Although the court recognized that overseers of
the poor could bind a child to Shakers, the court in Dyer invalidated the indenture because the
overseers of the poor in Norwich, Vermont could not legally bind a child to a Shaker in New
Hampshire. See id. at 405.
14. See Brewer, Demographic Features, supra note 11, at 49.
15. See SUSAN GRIGG, THE DEPENDENT POOR OF NEWBURYPORT: STUDIES IN SOCIAL
HISTORY, 1800-1830 59 (1984) (describing the informal practice of leaving children with Shakers
who would not charge for board); REPORT OF THE EXAMINATION OF THE SHAKERS OF
CANTERBURY AND ENFIELD, BEFORE THE NEW HAMPSHIRE LEGISLATURE, AT THE NOVEMBER
SESSION, 1848, INCLUDING THE TESTIMONY AT LENGTH 70 (1849) (testimony of Caleb M. Dyer)
(stating that the Enfield, New Hampshire, Shakers did not "charge... the town for supporting
paupers").
16. LAMSON, supra note 12, at 200-01.
17. See Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, August 22, 1844 (mentioning that the Shakers of
Harvard, Massachusetts decided to release a boy because there is "no believer in him").
18. See Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, June 11, 1845 (stating that a fifteen year-old boy ran
away to return to his parents).
19. In reviewing the Journal of Grove B. Blanchard between 1836 and 1845, and the Harvard
Sisters Book between 1840 and 1844, I found a number of entries indicating that children had left the
Harvard and Shirley communities without incident. See, e.g., Journal of Grove B. Blanchard,
August 22, 1844; Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, June 11 th, 1845.
The popular literature of the time, however, included numerous narratives describing the travails
of parents and seemed to leave the impression that Shakers were always reluctant to allow children
19921
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But, when parents or legal guardians wanted the return of a child who
wished to remain with the Shakers, the Shakers sometimes used the law,
both offensively and defensively, as a means of keeping a child. Shakers
would defend the right of the child to remain in the community by going
to court to ask for or to answer a writ of habeas corpus. When difficul-
ties with parents were anticipated, the Shakers would attempt to
strengthen their claim to custody by going to court in a guardianship
proceeding.2°
An examination of these cases against the backdrop of Shaker culture
is important for three interrelated reasons. First, the Shaker custody
cases involved the possibility of giving custody of children to social units
that differed from the conventional model of the nineteenth-century fam-
ily. By examining these cases within the context of Shaker familial rela-
tionships, I hope to offer a more complete account of the development of
nineteenth-century custody law. Second, when histories group Shaker
communities together, each community's own unique characteristics are
lost. Third, legal historians are recognizing the importance of "recover-
ing" the untold stories of women, children, and other groups tradition-
ally excluded from histories of the prevailing legal culture. Unless those
stories are personalized or updated with new perspectives, our under-
standing of the past is likely to be incomplete or fostered by the groups
that are dominant in contemporary culture.21
After Part I's brief summary of important components of Shaker the-
ology and social practices that relate to the sect's conception of the fam-
ily, Part II will provide a brief description of the development of the
"best interests" standard in child custody litigation, highlight two cases
decided in Massachusetts that recognized the rights of Shakers to keep
children willing to stay with them, and contrast those cases to judicial
decisions and legislative activities in other states. The Massachusetts
cases fit squarely into one interpretation of the doctrinal development of
family law, an interpretation that links respect for the rights of non-par-
ents in custody disputes to the developing concept of the family as "con-
jugal, nuclear, highly differentiated and specialized, private, and child-
centered. '2 2 At the same time, they pose theoretical questions that have
to go. In one, a critic of the Shakers describes an incident in which a father who had indentured his
children was denied the opportunity to get them back. The account does not indicate whether the
children were kept because that was their preference or because the Shakers in that community made
it a practice to keep children regardless of their preferences. The father eventually "kidnapped" his
children and the Shakers did not pursue legal action. See LAMSON, supra note 12, at 177-84.
20. On February 8, 1842, for example, the Harvard Shakers initiated a hearing at the Worcester
Probate court to obtain guardianship of a fourteen year-old boy whose mother wanted to take him
back. See Harvard Sisters' Book, February 8, 1842.
21. See Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows'" Toward a History of
Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819, 820-21.
22. Jamil Zinaldin, The Emergence of A Modern American Family Law: Child Custody,
Adoption, and the Courts, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1038, 1047, 1047-52, 1075-84 (1979) (arguing that
[Vol. 4: 33
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been recognized, but not answered, by historians.2" First, if doctrinal
development in custody law was related to a changing conception of the
family, why did the doctrine ultimately operate in favor of Shaker fami-
lies? Second, why did Massachusetts courts not even question whether
"the environment provided by the celibates was inherently unsuitable,"
24
when courts25 and legislatures 26 in other states did?
27
Part III offers a narrative of an unreported case, drawn from manu-
scripts within the collection of the Fruitlands Museums and from secon-
dary histories of the Harvard and Shirley Shakers, that gives the Shakers'
perspective on child custody litigation and provides a framework for Part
IV's explanation of the courtroom successes of the Harvard and Shirley
communities.
Finally, the paper concludes by describing an ironic paradox. Doctri-
nal development in the law of child custody, which reinforced society's
increased concern for the protection and development of children and
enabled the Shakers to retain children during the first half of the nine-
teenth century, eventually decreased the number of children coming into
their communities during the second half of the century. By fostering an
increased concern in the society at large for the "best interests" of chil-
dren, the Shakers, through their legal battles, helped bring about the cre-
ation of social institutions that were also able to address the needs of
children. The success of the Massachusetts Shakers in child custody
cases also demonstrates that nineteenth-century courts were not singu-
larly committed to the emerging concept of the nuclear family, and that a
community whose values and practices differed markedly from main-
stream values and practices can successfully defend its way of life.
when courts awarded custody to third parties who were not parents, they legitimized the new child-
centered family created by the voluntary transfer of custody).
23. Cf GRIGG, supra note 15, at 59 (describing the placement of four children by the overseers
of the poor of the town of Newburyport, Massachusetts, with the Shakers in Canterbury, New
Hampshire as "curio[us]," given that the environment of Shaker communities was "heterodox").
24. WEISBROD, BOUNDARIES, supra note 9, at 37.
25. See, e.g., People ex rel Barbour v. Gates, 43 N.Y. 40 (1870), rev'g 57 Barb. 291 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1869); Fowler v. Hollenbeck, 9 Barb. 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 1850); People ex reL Fowler v.
Pillow, I Sand. 672 (N.Y. Super. 1849); M'Dowle v. M'Dowle, 8 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811);
State ex reL Ball v. Hand, 5 WEST. L.J. 361 (Ohio Super. 1848).
26. WEISBROD, BOUNDARIES, supra note 9, at 37, 45-50 (examining legislative attempts to
control Shaker practices in Ohio, New York, New Hampshire, and Kentucky); see also infra, notes
200-213 and accompanying text.
27. There is evidence that suggests that a Massachusetts court decided in favor of a father
against the Shakers in a case involving the Hancock Community decided in 1852. See PRISCILLA
BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, SHAKER LIVES (1986) 149-50 (hereinafter BREWER, SHAKER
COMMUNITIES]. According to Professor Brewer, who read of the case in a journal kept at the
Winterthur Museum in Delaware, the Shakers felt that the judge in the case was biased against
them. Telephone interview with Priscilla J. Brewer, Assistant Professor of American Studies,
University of South Florida, Tampa (April 18, 1990). No record of this case appears to have been
printed in the case reporters for the year.
1992]
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PART I: SHAKER THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL PRACTICES
In her study of a sample of nineteenth-century communities, Rosabeth
Moss Kanter identifies 120 social practices that correlate with the degree
to which a community resists forces that try to break it apart. These
commitment mechanisms, argues Kanter, are concrete techniques for
achieving the values of any Utopian community: perfectibility, order,
brotherhood, unity of body and mind, experimentation, and coherence.28
They are designed to promote sacrifice for the community, investment in
the community, renunciation of relationships disruptive to the group,
communion among members of the community, mortification of prior
experiences, and transcendence.29 For example, a commitment mecha-
nism that fosters transcendence is the creation of a special form of
address for community leaders.30 Similarly, requiring celibacy of com-
munity members is a commitment mechanism that fosters sacrifice.31
The Shakers owed their longevity to the fact that their daily lives
reflected a number of commitment mechanisms, the most important of
which radically altered the concept of the family.
Like many American utopian communities of the nineteenth-century,
the Shakers traced their origin to a single charismatic figure, in this case
Mother Ann Lee.32 But unlike other communities that failed to survive
for long without their leader, the Shakers prospered after the death of
Mother Ann, who emigrated from England to this country with a small
band of followers in 1774.33
Central to Shaker teachings was the belief that Mother Ann "embod-
ied the second coming of the Christ spirit."' 34 The presence of God's
spirit in Mother Ann was possible because each individual had the capa-
bility of receiving His "indwelling presence. ' 35 Worship practices con-
sisted of receiving that spirit through gifts that manifested themselves in
ecstatic ways-dancing or shaking-or in subdued ones-meditations
and revelations. 36 Also important was the notion that God had a female
component called Holy Mother Wisdom. 37 This translated into a recog-
28. See ROSABETH KANTER, COMMITMENT AND COMMUNITY: COMMUNES AND UTOPIAS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 32-57 (1972).
29. See id at 76-125.
30. See id. at 124.
31. See id at 80.
32. See id. at 116-20 (describing the personalities of some of the more well-known leaders of
utopian communities, such as Father Rapp of the Harmony Society and John Noyes of Oneida).
33. See id at 244-45 (describing the Shakers as one of 11 "successful" communities that existed
in the United States between 1780 and 1860, and defining success as lasting for twenty-five years-a
"sociological" generation).
34. BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, supra note 27, at 6.
35. Johnson, Life in the Christ Spirit: Observations in Shaker Theology, 8 SHAKER Q. 67, 67
(1988).
36. See DARYL CHASE, THE EARLY SHAKERS: AN EXPERIMENT IN RELIGIOUS COMMUNISM
14-18 (1938); Johnson, supra note 35, at 74.
37. See BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, supra note 27, at 6.
[V/ol. 4: 33
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nition that individuals could best possess God's spirit by exhibiting mas-
culine qualities of strength and power, and feminine qualities of
compassion and mercy.38 Shaker practices were simple: "confession was
the door to the regenerate life, celibacy its rule and cross."39 Early con-
verts were won with "personalized" efforts directed around Niskeyuna,
New York.4" As a result of being driven out of New York by authorities
who suspected them of being Tory sympathizers,4" Mother Ann and a
group of her followers began a two-year missionary tour of
Massachusetts.42
Converts were not hard to find in New England during the end of the
eighteenth century and the first quarter of the nineteenth; the revivalism
of the Great Awakening splintered many Protestant sects. As Separate-
Baptist dissenters in New England grew more successful in challenging
the state-imposed tax support of the Congregational church in Massa-
chusetts, they were less often stigmatized by the religious orthodoxy as
"socially and religiously inferior."43 And when Baptists lost their radical
aura, individuals looking for a simple religion based on piety turned else-
where." Fearing the threat that the attraction of Shaker piety posed to
their membership ranks, Baptist leaders mounted organized resistance
against the Shakers.45 In Pittsfield, a leading Baptist minister who had
joined the Shakers in Niskeyuna with his entire congregation in 1780,
wrote a scathing expos6 of the community after he recanted. Eventually,
he convinced the Pittsfield town meeting to investigate banning the
Shakers from the town.46 The Baptist resistance to Shakers, however,
seems to have died out by 1795,"7 as Baptists focused their efforts on
controlling inroads by other competitors-Universalists, Methodists, and
Free-Will Baptists.4"
The Shaker debt to the Baptists, however, endured. In the years after
the death of Mother Ann, the sect's theology was consolidated by Father
Joseph Meacham, a radical Baptist minister whose father had refused to
38. See Johnson, supra note 35, at 71.
39. EDWARD ANDREWS, THE PEOPLE CALLED SHAKERS 12 (1953) [hereinafter ANDREWS,
THE PEOPLE].
40. Id. at 27.
41. See 2 WILLIAM MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT: 1630-1833 712 (1971).
42. See ANDREWS, THE PEOPLE, supra note 39, at 36-44.
43. 2 McLOUGHLIN, supra note 41, at 1263 (1971); see also id. at 698 (describing the effects of
"the growth in the size, wealth, learning, and respectability of their membership" on the Baptists);
BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, supra note 27, at 2-6.
44. See BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, supra note 27, at 3.
45. See 2 McLOUGHLIN, supra note 41, at 709-17.
46. See BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, supra note 27, at 7-8; 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note
41, at 714-15.
47. See 2 McLOUGHLIN, supra note 41, at 717 ("although in 1783 'the Shakers were a large
body... we seldom hear of them now, unless it is by way of observing that the power which then
actuated them is gone; and their attention is much fixed upon worldly schemes of gain.' ") (quoting 2
ISAAC BACKUS, HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND 404 (D. Weston ed. 1871)).
48. See id. at 717-49.
1992]
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join the Warren Association that tried to unite radical Baptists with the
more mainstream element of the sect in 1762, 49 and Mother Lucy
Wright. Four crucial tenets emerged during their reign:
Private property was surrendered to the group so that all members
might partake equally of their heritage on earth. Marriage also had
no place among them .... Celibacy solved forever the problem of
competition between love of God and love of family .... [L]ove for
biological relatives was superseded by love for all Christian Brothers
and Sisters.5"
In practice, Wright and Meacham focused their efforts on designing
community practices that could be replicated wherever there were a suffi-
cient number of Shakers to combine into a productive unit.5 These
practices balanced obedience to authority with autonomy through self-
government.
5 2
Their first step was to decree a separation from the world. 53 Building
on the work of Father James Wright, who served as a transitional leader
of the sect for the first three years after Mother Ann's death, Meacham
and Wright temporarily ended missionary activities in order to allow the
sect to focus on internal development.5 4
Next, they organized the ministerial hierarchy. To assist them in the
Central Ministry, now located in New Lebanon, New York, Meacham
and Wright appointed two additional elders to co-lead the sect.55 Each
bishopric would have its own male and female elders, directly accounta-
ble to the Central Ministry. 6 Meacham and Wright also structured an
organizational hierarchy for each community that revolved around fami-
lies of between thirty and one hundred members.5 Meacham and
Wright first envisioned a hierarchy of families. In each community there
would be a first family, or church family, which would include the most
spiritual members of the community, a second family, which would
include young workers, and an office family, which would include the
elderly.58 "[T]his basic structure was expanded with the addition of fur-
ther 'orders' or 'families,' such as the children's order, a backsliders'
order, and.., a 'gathering order' for people who wished to try Shaker-
49. See BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, supra note 27, at 6-7.
50. Id. at 5.
51. See id. at 19.
52. See James Guimond, The Leadership of Three Experimental Communities, 11 SHAKER Q.
95, 108 (1971).
53. See ANDREWS, THE PEOPLE, supra note 39, at 56; MARJORIE PROCTER-SMITH, WOMEN IN
SHAKER COMMUNITY AND WORSHIP 40 (1985).
54. BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, supra note 27, at 16.
55. See ANDREWS, WORK AND WORSHIP, supra note 9, at 24.
56. See BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, supra note 27, at 25-28.
57. See id. at 68.
58. See ANDREWS, THE PEOPLE, supra note 39, at 57.
[Vol. 4: 33
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ism."59 Each family would have two elders and two eldresses. They
would hear confession and oversee obedience to the standards dictated by
the Central Ministry.' Each family would also have two deacons and
two deaconesses to supervise the business, financial, and household oper-
ations of the family.6 Eventually, the Central Ministry added trustees or
office deacons to each family-men who represented the family in its
legal capacity.62 From 1790 to 1793, the Central Ministry implemented
the plan, appointing the leaders of all the New England societies. Sisters
and brothers from New Lebanon would travel to new communities to
assist them in organizing.63 Afterward, elders at each level would be
appointed by their predecessors and confirmed by the elders at the level
immediately above them."
Each Shaker family was expected to be a self-contained socioeconomic
unit. "[F]amilies were economically autonomous, buying from and sell-
ing to other families in the same community."65 Children assisted in
family chores; because work within the family was sex-specific," chil-
dren's tasks were, as well. "Most boys learned early to help with farm
and garden chores like haying and hoeing, as well as chopping wood and
cutting ice in winter. Girls were trained to assist Sisters in textile pro-
duction and to devote themselves fully to whatever work was
assigned." '67 Workspace and living arrangements segregated the sexes.
"They sat at separate tables for meals, and worked in separate build-
ings."68 Although contact between the sexes was discouraged, union
meetings were held twice weekly to enable family members to interact
under the supervision of elders in order to prevent illicit contact.6 9 The
children of a family were supervised by caretakers of both sexes. "In
general, the care and education of children did not fall exclusively on
women." 70 If there were enough children to warrant a children's order,
59. PROCTER-SMITH, supra note 53, at 45.
60. See id. at 45, 64.
61. See id at 45-47, 64.
62. See ANDREWS, WORK AND WORSHIP, supra note 9, at 41; PROCTER-SMITH, supra note 53,
at 47.
63. See ANDREWS, WORK AND WORSHIP, supra note 9, at 27.
64. See BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, supra note 27, at 44-45.
65. ANDREWS, WORK AND WORSHIP, supra note 9, at 45.
66. See PROCTER-SMITH, supra note 53, at 56-69. The work performed within Shaker families
and Shaker communities varied. The agricultural products produced by a given community did not
differ from the products produced by other farms; what they did not consume, they sold to the
outside world. "From the outset, they bought from and sold freely to the world's markets."
ANDREWS, WORK AND WORSHIP, supra note 9, at 84. The Shakers specialized in high quality
seeds, medicinal herbs, brooms, brushes, and boxes. See generally id. at 40-159 (describing the
products produced by the Shakers, both for their own use and for sale). For a more comprehensive
assessment of the industries of the Shakers, see generally ANDREWS, COMMUNITY INDUSTRIES,
supra note 6.
67. BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, supra note 27, at 77.
68. PROCTER-SMITH, supra note 53, at 56.
69. See BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, supra note 27, at 21, 72-73.
70. PROCTER-SMITH, supra note 53, at 60.
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it had separate quarters and its own elders and eldresses.7t
Meacham and Wright's final step was related to their goal of achieving
economic separation from the world. The communities needed their own
property, both real and personal. "Although the communal idea had not
originally entered into Ann Lee's social and religious doctrines," an oral
agreement on basic principles of property rights was made soon after
New Lebanon was organized in 1788.72 The covenant was written down
by Meacham in 1795 and promulgated to each family in each commu-
nity.73 The five articles of this covenant provided that its signers agree to
commit their property to the church voluntarily, to abide by the deacons'
discretion to use the property for the good of the community, and to
support the community to the best of their abilities.74 Although the
Shakers' covenants were tested by apostates in the early years of the cen-
tury,7 5 the increasing number of children forced the Shakers to litigate in
another arena-that of child custody. 6
PART II: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "BEST INTERESTS" STANDARD
Child custody cases involving Shaker families pose a theoretical chal-
lenge to modern social and legal histories of the family. When courts in
the second quarter of the nineteenth century awarded custody of children
to Shakers, they reinforced a conception of the family that deviated sig-
nificantly from the conceptual model of the family that had emerged by
the 1850s.
This model envisions a family as having three important characteris-
tics. The first characteristic of the nineteenth-century family is that it
was an institution separate from the society in which it existed, 77 an insti-
tution designed to provide a haven from a world growing "crueler with
... industrial development."' The colonial family, in contrast, is seen
by historians as having been "an extension and reflection of the commu-
nity at large."' 79 Although a Shaker community shared some of the char-
acteristics of the nineteenth-century family in providing respite from the
71. See ANDREWS, THE PEOPLE, supra note 39, at 186-88; PROCTER-SMITH, supra note 53, at
60.
72. See ANDREWS, THE PEOPLE, supra note 39, at 57; ANDREWS, WORK AND WORSHIP, supra
note 9, at 21.
73. See ANDREWS, THE PEOPLE, supra note 39, at 61; HORGAN, supra note 2, at 55.
74. See ANDREWS, THE PEOPLE, supra note 39, at 62.
75. The first case described by Andrews was filed in the New York Supreme Court by Jonathan
Walker in 1799 "for $3000 which he claimed represented wages that were not paid him while he was
a member of the order." Id. at 68.
76. "Between 1800 and 1820, the proportion of members under sixteen in all the eastern
communities had increased dramatically, from 2.8 percent to 19.8 percent." BREWER, SHAKER
COMMUNITIES, supra note 27, at 39.
77. See Lee Teitelbaum, The Legal History of the Family, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1052, 1052-55
(1987) [hereinafter Teitelbaum, The Legal History].
78. Nancy Chodorow, Mothering, Male Dominance, and Capitalism, in CAPITALIST
PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM 83, 92 (Z. Eisenstein ed., 1979).
79. See Teitelbaum, The Legal History, supra note 77, at 1053.
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outside world, 0 a Shaker family's role within a Shaker community was
more similar to that of the colonial family within colonial society. Both
Shaker and colonial families shared an organizational structure that was
similar to that of the greater societies in which they existed."1
The model also views the nineteenth-century family as "consist[ing] of
a worldly man, homebound woman, and their offspring." 2 In contrast,
Shaker families were large and extended; children were reared collec-
tively by unrelated and unmarried adults. In the words of John Noyes,
the founder of the Oneida Community, another utopian group, "[t]he
Shakers... exclude familism with religious horror. "83
Finally, the nineteenth-century family was "a collection of individuals
each with his or her own needs and rights."8 4 Yet, in Shaker families,
individual rights were subordinated to the good of the family and the
larger community.8 5
Explaining the emergence of this model of the family, and its child-
centered focus, is problematic. Martha Minow, for example, has criti-
cized both the traditional explanation for the emergence of the model,
which sees law as progressing along a path toward increasing protection
of individual rights, and the feminist explanation for the emergence of
the model, which sees the creation of the ideology of "separate spheres"
for family life and community life as limiting the rights of women.
6
Even if developing a normative explanation for the model is difficult, a
description of it emerges by tracing the doctrine related to child custody
litigation. In these cases, judges were given the opportunity to reconcep-
tualize the family; the choices that they made and the criteria upon
which they decided reflected their and society's vision of what families
should be.8 7
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, treatise writers and com-
mentators generally acknowledged that "[t]he determination of questions
relating to the custody of infants, from the very nature of the issues
involved, does not properly admit of the application of any artificial sys-
80. The implications of this observation will be discussed in Part IV, infra.
81. See ANDREWS, THE PEOPLE, supra note 39, at 193 (noting that "the government of the
Believers resembled, in many respects the oligarchic Puritan state").
82. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 9 (1985).
83. JOHN NOYES, STRANGE CULTS AND UTOPIAS OF 19TH-CENTURY AMERICA 141 (rev. ed.
1966). Noyes, in fact, noted that the non-religious utopian communities of the nineteenth century,
modeled on the theories of Robert Owen and Charles Fourier, although different in the approach to
the holding of property, shared one main idea: "the enlargement of home-the extension of family
union beyond the little man-and-wife circle to large corporations." Id. at 23 (emphasis in the
original omitted).
84. Id. at 234.
85. See DESROCHE, supra note 5, at 174-78, 210-29; GREEN & WELLS, supra note 10, at 58-64
(describing the structure of Shaker families).
86. See Minow, supra note 21, at 827-39.
87. See Teitelbaum, The Legal History, supra note 77, at 1062.
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tern of precedents or technical set of rules.""8 Instead, the welfare of the
child would be the "paramount consideration in the determination of
each case." 9 Hurd's treatise on habeas corpus lists the factors that were
included in determining how best to enhance the welfare of the child:
The welfare of the child ... requires attention to many circum-
stances; such as its sex, age, health and social position as affected by
that of its parents; its just expectations of property from them or
either of them or from others; and the state of its morals and educa-
tion, and the surest means, under the circumstances, of securing for
it that discipline and instruction necessary to qualify it for that sta-
tion in life which the parents, had no controversy arisen, it may be
reasonably supposed, would have desired and been able by their for-
tune or industry to prepare it to occupy.
The comparative qualifications also of the parents to provide for
these various wants require consideration, such as their temper,
morals, habits, judgment."
Although this list is included in the section of the treatise pertaining to
disputes between two parents, elsewhere Hurd indicates that the welfare
of the child also guides courts in determining custody when there has
been a voluntary transfer of custody, and so suggests that the same stan-
dards apply. 91
Divorce gave courts the greatest opportunity to refine the doctrine,92
but custody disputes also arose between parents in the non-divorce con-
text, between parents and non-parents, or between competing non-par-
ents. These disputes were often resolved through a habeas corpus action
brought to challenge a voluntary or involuntary transfer of custody. 93 In
addition, habeas corpus actions often challenged a faulty indenture
agreement or a guardianship determination.94 Although the writ was
issued to insure that custody was not an existing state of illegal
88. LEWIS HOCHHEIMER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO THE CUSTODY OF INFANTS
1 (1887); see also RANSOM TYLER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF INFANCY 273 (2d ed. 1882).
89. HOCHHEIMER, supra note 88, at 96.
90. FRANK HURD, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PRACTICE CONNECTED WITH IT 462 (2d ed. 1876).
91. Id. at 540-48. It is not clear, however, that these are the standards that would apply in all
cases of a voluntary transfer of custody-for example, when an indenture was the instrument that
transferred custody.
92. See GROSSBERG, supra note 82, at 250-53.
93. The writ of habeas corpus gave courts jurisdiction to challenge an "alleged illegal restraint of
personal liberty" imposed by a public or private authority. HURD, supra note 90, at v. In the sphere
of domestic relations, the common law authorized a court to grant the writ "on the application of
the husband, parent, guardian and master for the purpose of inquiring into any illegal restraint,
respectively, of the wife, child, ward or apprentice." Id. at 449. The use of the writ of habeas corpus
in cases in which the custody of a child was at issue was recognized as a modification and an
extension of the original writ. In order to authorize the issuance of a writ, courts devised a legal
fiction to equate "unauthorized absence from legal custody" with "imprisonment." Id. at 453.
94. See Zinaldin, supra note 22, at 1076-84.
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restraint,9" the court was bound to insure that its disposition did not cre-
ate conditions that could be harmful to the child.96 Consequently, the
summary proceeding actually had long-term effects; the child would be
permitted to remain with the individual to whom he or she was commit-
ted "while the circumstances shown in evidence remain[ed] unaltered." 97
Hurd did not suggest rules to correlate with the general standards
applied in divorce or habeas actions. Rather, he recognized that judges
had significant discretion when considering the conflicting claims. For
example, they sometimes found in favor of "the devoted mother's
love,"9 and at other times found in favor of "the loving father's cor-
recting hand." 99 Other commentators were not without a sense of irony
in trying to explain the doctrine. In comparing the outcome in Pool v.
Gott," a case in which Chief Justice Shaw granted custody of a thirteen-
year-old girl to her grandparents, with whom she had been living since
birth, in a habeas corpus action brought by her father, with the outcome
in Verser v. Ford,'0' a case in which the court granted custody of a three-
year-old child to her grandparents, one anonymous commentator noted
that "[h]ere he applied too late; in Verser v. Ford, he applied too soon.
He would be troubled to tell exactly when to apply, it seems."' 2
The facts of the two cases do suggest that some guidelines had devel-
oped to shape the inquiry of courts. For example, in Pool, the "best
interests" of the child test was focused on the child's wishes because she
was old enough to articulate them. The court determined that the child
herself "was devotedly attached to her grandparents" and that the "ter-
mination of this relation would be, for a long time at least, the cause of
great suffering to her and them."' 3 In Verser, the "best interests" test
focused on the child's "tender age," sex, delicate health, and the presence
of a step-mother." Yet, these standards could be narrowly or broadly
defined by courts to award or deny custody to a father, a mother, or a
third party. 1
05
95. See HURD, supra note 90, at 458.
96. See id at 458; see also Gideon Bantz, Habeas Corpus: Custody of Infant, 15 CENT. L.J. 281,
283 (1882).
97. See HURD, supra note 90, at 458. Formally, the long-term effect was enhanced because the
ruling in the habeas corpus case would have res judicata effect in a subsequent challenge brought
under the same conditions. Id at 462.
98. Id at 462.
99. Id. at 463.
100. 14 L. REP. 269 (Mass. 1851).
101. 37 Ark. 27 (1881).
102. Relinquishment of Parent's Right of Custody of Child to Third Person, 6 VA. L.J. 470, 473
(1882).
103. Pool, 14 L. REP. at 270.
104. See Verser, 37 Ark. at 31.
105. See GROSSBERG, supra note 82, at 254, 259-68. Other trends in the judicial exercise of
discretion have been noted. First, that a child below 12 would be best cared for by the mother.
Second, that older boys should be raised by fathers. Third, that courts should respect the ties that a
child had already developed. Fourth, that the child's opinion should be respected. See Zinaldin,
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The "best interests" standard summarized by the nineteenth-century
treatise writers and their modem counterparts can be traced to the rheto-
ric of child welfare that entered into judicial opinions during the first half
of the century. Tracing the origin of that rhetoric, however, remains a
more difficult task. Although the concept of judicial discretion to award
custody was probably first announced most clearly by Lord Mansfield in
Rex v. Deleval,'° other factors encouraged courts to look at the welfare
of children. The modem ideal of childhood, which was created by and
fostered modem family life, suggested to nineteenth-century judges that
children had to be protected.'t 7 Children were "the future of the young
republic,"'0 8 and parents, primarily mothers, were expected to focus on
the education and moral training of children to prepare them for entry
into the larger world, but not until they were ready to overcome its cor-
rupting influences." In the second quarter of the century, this rhetoric
was enhanced by its political appeal, which provided support for the
competing ideologies of Jacksonians and Whigs."o For Whigs, fostering
the welfare of children meant fostering their moral development. For
Jacksonians, fostering the welfare of children meant providing them with
the resources necessary to become successful property owners. As a
result, it was a recognized fact of child custody adjudication"' that
judges could exercise discretion to abrogate the old common law rule
that only a father (or a mother, in the event of the death of the father' 12)
was entitled to his child's "labor and services.
'' 13
The emergence of this "best interests" standard is demonstrated in two
child custody cases involving the Shakers in Massachusetts. Common-
wealth v. Hammond 1"4 put at issue the legitimacy of both a guardianship
and an indenture. Margaret Holst's mother, a widow, executed a verbal
contract with Joseph Hammond, a member of the Shaker community in
Harvard,' that required him to provide her daughter with "support and
education" until she turned twenty-one. 116 At some time after the agree-
supra note 22, at 1072-75; see also GROSSBERG, supra note 82, at 248-50 (adding that when the
custody dispute arose during divorce, a child would be given to the innocent party).
106. 3 Burr. 1434, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (1763).
107. See Zinaldin, supra note 22, at 1047-52.
108. Id.
109. See Lee Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 1135, 1142-44
[hereinafter Teitelbaum, Family History].
110. See ROBERT DELONE, SMALL FUTURES: CHILDREN, INEQUALITY, AND THE LIMITS OF
LIBERAL REFORM 35-48 (1979).
111. See GROSSBERG, supra note 82, at 253; Zinaldin, supra note 22, at 1068-74.
112. See HURD, supra note 90, at 42 (stating that a woman becomes the head of her family upon
the death of her husband). For an interesting analysis of the way that the legal status of widowhood
gave women the opportunity to experiment with social roles, see Minow, supra note 21, at 851-60.
113. TYLER, supra note 88, at 35.
114. 27 Mass. (10 Pick) 274 (1830).
115. Hammond was originally a member of Harvard's Church family, but became an elder in his
own family, the South Family, in 1822. See Journal of the South and East Families, May 5, 1822.
He left the South Family for a post in the Bishopric Ministry in 1830. See id., June 6, 1830.
116. Id. at 274. Massachusetts law allowed a father, a mother in the event of his death, or a
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ment had been made, the probate court of Suffolk County appointed
Ephraim Tufts as Margaret's guardian." 7 Tufts applied for a writ of
habeas corpus which was issued to Hammond." 8 Both Tufts and Ham-
mond agreed that the child had not been ill-treated and that she wanted
to remain with Hammond."19 The court, indicating that there was some
dispute between the guardian and the mother, refused to rule on the
question of custody. 2 ° In addition, although the court's opinion does
not specifically state that the verbal agreement was faulty, it presumably
believed that it was; had the indenture been valid, there would not have
been any need for the exercise of discretion in Hammond's favor. 12' The
court affirmed that it had "discretion" to refrain from interfering "where
the liberty of the party is not injuriously or unwarrantably infringed,"
and allowed Margaret to choose whether to remain with Hammond or to
leave. '
22
The court's consideration of what was in Margaret's best interest was
limited to asking whether she was well cared-for and whether she wanted
to stay where she was. The case illustrates both that courts were willing
to exercise their discretion so as not to award custody to the legal guard-
ian-in this case either Margaret's mother or Ephraim Tufts-and that
children's interests were to be assessed in part by determining what they
wanted.
Whether the court considered other factors in determining that Mar-
garet's welfare would not be harmed if she were to remain with Ham-
mond is unclear. 23  By the time of the decision in Curtis v. Curtis, 24
however, the court's inquiry during the habeas corpus action had
expanded. On October 8, 1851, Mrs. Jane Curtis, a widow, sent her
three children "up to the Shakers" in Enfield, Connecticut. 125  The
indenture agreement that she executed with Joseph Fairbank, a trustee of
legal guardian to bind a minor under the age of 14 as an apprentice. The consent of the minor was
required if the minor was more than 14 years old. The statute also required that the indenture be in
writing. See 1794 Mass. Acts, ch. 64 (1896); MAss. REv. STAT, ch. 80, §§ 1, 5 (1836).
117. Hammond, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) at 274. A guardian could be appointed for a minor under
the age of fourteen at the discretion of the probate court judge. MASS. REv. STAT., cl. 79, §§ 1, 2
(1836) (codifying 1783 Mass. Acts, ch. 38, §§ I and 2). If a minor was over the age of fourteen, he or
she could elect his or her own guardian, subject to the approval of the probate court judge. Id. at
§ 2. If a father or his widow was alive, the judge would have had to determine that the parent duly
entitled to custody was incompetent prior to granting guardianship to a third party. Id at § 4.
Although it is unclear how old Margaret was at the time that her mother contracted with Hammond
or at the time that Tufts was appointed her guardian, she was 11 and one-half years old when the
writ of habeas corpus was issued. See Hammond, 27 Mass (10 Pick.) at 274.
118. See 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) at 274.
119. See id.
120. See id at 274-75 ("we do not think proper to decide upon the relative rights of the mother
and the guardian in respect to the custody of the child.").
121. See Zinaldin, supra note 22, at 1078.
122. Hammond, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) at 275.
123. See supra note 90, and accompanying text.
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the Enfield Society, specified that her children would be educated in
accordance with Shaker principles, and would be required to work for
Fairbank until their majority in exchange for "comfortable food, clothing
and lodging."' 26 The agreement prevented Jane Curtis from interfering
with her children's indentures, either by directly or indirectly inducing
them to leave Fairbank's service. 127 After less than a year, Emily, the
oldest child, had become a believer. On April 27, 1852, when she was
twelve, she chose Fairbank as her guardian in the Probate Court for the
District of Enfield. 1
28
On January 22, 1856, she accompanied three members of her Shaker
family to Springfield, Massachusetts. While in Springfield, at a store on
Main Street, she was taken by her mother and brother, "against her
wishes, protestations, and resistance," and was "carried . . .across
[Main] [S]treet and placed on board the express train of cars, then start-
ing for Boston."' 29 Joseph Fairbank had a writ of habeas corpus issued
to Jane Curtis on January 25, 1856.130
Jane Curtis' argument, which Chief Justice Shaw rejected, was that the
indenture did not relinquish her control over her daughter because it had
been invalidly executed under the laws of Connecticut. Shaw held
instead that regardless of the validity of the agreement, it operated to
estop her from claiming her right to custody."3' His holding was, how-
ever, dependent upon his finding that Emily wanted to return to the
Shakers. After interviewing Emily, Chief Justice Shaw concluded:
We are satisfied, by an examination, that this girl is capable of judg-
ing what will best promote her own welfare... ; that she is strongly
inclined to remain with the society of Shakers.' 32
Shaw reasoned that Emily was well cared-for, well-educated, and that
she was attached to the "friends and associates" with whom she came to
Massachusetts. 3 3 He also seemed swayed by the fact that Jane Curtis
"clandestinely and forcibly" took her daughter.13 4 He released Emily
from her mother's restraint and allowed her to return to her guardian, "if
she pleases."'
' 3 5
Neither in Hammond nor in Curtis did the court examine the Shakers'
suitability as care-givers. Although in form, each court only released the
child to whomever the child elected to return and each court only issued
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 536.
129. Petition filed in the County of Hampden, Curtis v. Curtis, No. 1317, 1856 (on file at the
Massachusetts State Archives, Boston, Massachusetts).
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a summary ruling and not a custody determination, the substantive effect
of each ruling was to approve of the Shakers as child custodians. Such
was not the case in New York and Ohio, other states that had Shaker
cases important to the doctrinal development of custody law. In New
York, for example, the judicial opinions in a series of cases involving
three custody disputes addressed arguments made by opposing counsel
that Shaker practices argued against their suitability as custodians.
In the first New York case, In re M'Dowle, 36 Matthew M'Dowle exe-
cuted indenture agreements to bind his sons, Hugh and John, to mem-
bers of the Shaker community in Watervliet, New York. Although the
agreements were invalid under New York law because they had not been
signed by the children, the court refused to award custody to the father
at the hearing on his writ of habeas corpus; it limited its inquiry to exam-
ining whether the children were held against their will. The court deter-
mined that the children, ages eight and eleven, were "at liberty to go
where they please."13 7 The court reporter added the following to a note
at the end of the opinion:
Afterwards, the counsel for the father suggested to the court, that
improper means and constraint had been used by the masters and
others, belonging to the Shakers, to induce the children to declare
their election to return, and that the answers were not freely given
by them to the court.1
3 8
The court appointed three attorneys to conduct an independent examina-
tion of the boys.' 39 Although the court did not change its ruling, the
passage suggests that the father's counsel thought that an argument
based on the "deviance" of the Shakers was a viable one. Indeed, the
argument was persuasive enough to convince the judge to act upon it. 140
The next reported cases in New York involved the family of William
Pillow.14' On December 15, 1846, Pillow signed indentures to bind his
three sons to Edward Fowler, 42 trustee of the New Lebanon, New York
community. ,43 Pillow's wife Ann had joined the Society, and was living
with the North Family." By July 1847, however, Pillow had changed
his mind. He came to the community to get his wife and his children
back. His initial efforts were unsuccessful. He tried again in September,
this time accompanied by a sheriff.' 45 Although Priscilla Brewer's
136. 8 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).




141. Fowler v. Hollenbeck, 9 Barb. 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 1850); People ex rel. Fowler v. Pillow,
1 Sand. 672 (N.Y. Super. 1849).
142. See P'llow, 1 Sand. at 673.
143. See id. at 677.
144. See BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNmES, supra note 27, at 148.
145. See id. at 149.
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account, derived from community records, indicates that the Shakers
surrendered Pillow's two youngest children in September when served
with a writ of habeas corpus,146 the court report suggests that Pillow did
not get any of his children until he secured a writ de homine replegiando
in December. 1
47
Fowler immediately petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging
that the children's indentures were legal, that they had been taken with-
out the petitioners' consent and against their own wishes, and that they
were restrained in New York City. 4 ' Pillow directed his arguments
along three separate lines. The first was procedural; the writ de homine
replegiando should have barred Fowler from bringing a habeas action.1
49
The second series of arguments was directed at the validity of the inden-
tures. The indentures were illegal, Pillow argued, because they did not
specify that the boys would be taught a specific trade' 50 and because they
actually bound the children to the trustee of a community, thereby bind-
ing them to the community itself.'5 ' The third series of arguments
invoked religion. Pillow argued that if the court did not allow him to
change his mind about his children's religious futures, their "rights of
conscience" and "freedom of religious belief" would be violated.' 52
Moreover, the Shakers sought indentured children only because they did
not produce children on their own, "contrary to good morals."' 53 To
these arguments, the Shakers not only responded that their practices
were no different than some of those of the Roman Catholic Church, but
they also responded that nothing in the indentures required that the chil-
dren be reared in Shakerism.1
54
Judge Sandford dealt with the first two arguments rather quickly. Pre-
cedent did not exist for holding that a writ de homine replegiando barred
a proceeding by habeas corpus. The two forms of actions were dis-
tinct.'55 He also rejected Pillow's arguments on the validity of the inden-
tures; both required exceedingly narrow interpretations of the indenture
and the statute. The designation of Fowler as a trustee was merely a
"description."' 5 6 Fowler was the boys' master in his individual capacity,
and would have been liable as an individual for the performance of his
146. See id.
147. See Pillow, 1 Sand. at 674-75. A writ de homine replegiando was used to replevy someone
out of prison or the custody of a private person. The individual seeking the writ was required to give
security to the sheriff that the person replevied would appear to answer charges. 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 129.
148. See Pillow, 1 Sand. at 673.
149. See id. at 676.
150. See id. at 675.
151. See id.
152. Id
153. Id. at 676.
154. Id. at 677.
155. See id at 678.
156. Id. at 677.
[Vol. 4: 33
18
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol4/iss1/3
Schneider
covenants in the agreement.1 57 Judge Sandford also found that the stat-
ute governing indentures only required that employment be taught. The
specific type of employment could be determined by the master after he
had assessed the apprentice's skills.158
The judge decided not to decide the religious practices issue. Even if
there had been sufficient proof that the Shakers engaged in "superstitions
and mummeries," he wrote, which there was not, the court's inquiry was
limited to whether the Shakers had violated the law.159 Judge Sandford
also referred to, without citing, legislation that had passed in New York
to protect Shakers' property rights,"6 which indicated legislative appro-
bation of the Shakers. 1 ' The judge examined the children, determined
that only the eldest wished to return to the Shakers, and ordered a court
officer to escort him back to the community.1 62 The case did not end
there. Fowler filed suit in an action for trespass on the case against the
sheriff who had issued the original writ and Pillow.163 The trial court
judge decreed a nonsuit on the grounds that Fowler had no action in
trespass because he was entitled to the children's services as their
master. 164
The last reported cases in New York involved the indenture of Maria
Barbour entered into by her widowed mother, who had once been a
member of a Shaker community. 165 In addition to addressing the family
structure of Shaker communities, the rhetoric of the opinion provides an
interesting contrast to the Hammond case in Massachusetts by focusing
on the appropriate role that a mother should play in the upbringing of
her child.
In 1866, when Maria Barbour was six, her mother indentured Maria
and another minor child to Benjamin Gates of the New Lebanon com-
munity. 166 According to the terms of the agreement, Gates was to teach
Maria to be a seamstress.' 67 In the habeas action, Mrs. Barbour alleged
that the agreement was faulty because it had not been endorsed by a
157. See id. at 677-78.
158. See id. at 678.
159. Id
160. See id. Judge Sanford was probably referring to legislation passed in 1839 that allowed
Shaker communities to hold property in trust up to the amount of $5,000. See Act of April 15, 1839,
1839 N.Y. Laws, ch. 174, at 146. The Act was amended in 1849 to simplify the provisions relating
to the descent of the trusts to new officeholders, see Act of April 11, 1849, 1849 N.Y. Laws, ch. 373,
at 527, and in 1852 to increase the amount of property that a society could hold to $10,000, see Act
of April 10, 1852, 1852 N.Y. Laws, ch 203, at 275. The Shakers began lobbying for these laws in
1829. See ANDREWS, THE PEOPLE, supra note 39, at 217-18.
161. See Pillow, 1 Sand. at 678.
162. See id. at 679.
163. See Fowler v. Hollenbeck, 9 Barb. 309, 312 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850).
164. See id. at 312-15.
165. See People ex rel Barbour v. Gates, 57 Barb. 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 1869), aff'd 43 N.Y. 40
(1870).,
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justice of the peace from the town of New Lebanon; instead, a separate
document was attached to the indenture, and that document was certified
by a judge from Canaan.'6 She read New York's statute to require judi-
cial approval of an indenture entered into by a mother, whether the
father was dead or whether he had abandoned his family.169
The supreme court judge sitting in the special term agreed.' 7° The
statute, he wrote, requires judicial approval of a mother's consent and
must be construed narrowly to protect the interests of the minor. He
acknowledged that the statute's requirement that a minor consent to the
indenture in order to be bound by it was a fiction because a minor cannot
consent to be bound. Consequently, the endorsement by the justice was
the only protection of the minor's rights. 7 If the endorsement did not
conform to standards, the child would not be bound.
The judge next considered whether the agreement bound the mother
independently of its effect on the child. Relying upon M'Dowle, he held
that the mother was prevented from asserting the right to custody of her
daughter. 72 But that holding did not end the court's inquiry. Although
Maria did not have to remain with Gates, she needed a lawful protec-
tor. 73 The judge considered Barbour's argument that the religious
beliefs of the Shakers disqualified them from obtaining custody, but con-
cluded, as Judge Stanford had, that the argument was misplaced.' 74
Instead, the judge based his decision to grant custody to Barbour on
other grounds. Because Maria was only nine-too young to make her
own decision and younger than Margaret Hammond-Judge Miller
invoked the court's equitable powers to conclude that Maria belonged
with her mother.'75 The judge assumed that Maria, if given the choice,
would have elected to remain with the Shakers. He concluded, however,
that "[t]he feeling of attachment to those with whom she has most
recently been intimately connected" would necessarily "yield to that
affection regard and love which none but a mother can feel and manifest
towards her offspring."' 76
Judge Miller's opinion was affirmed at the general term of the court. 1
77
On appeal, however, it was reversed. 178 Judge Allen concluded that both
lower courts had misread the statute; a justice of the peace's approval is
only required of an indenture entered into by a mother of a child whose
168. See id. at 292, 293.
169. See id. at 293.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 294.
172. See id. at 295-96.
173. See id. at 296.
174. See id. at 297.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 299.
177. See id.
178. See People ex rel Barbour v. Gates, 43 N.Y. 40, 48 (1870).
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father had abandoned her. "The authority of the mother to act [in the
event of the death of the father] was not first given by the Revised Stat-
utes. Before that time, the mother could give the required consent, if the
father was dead."' 79 The judge acknowledged, however, that the trial
court judge might have removed Maria from the Shakers even if the
indenture had been valid if he had found that the Shakers were unfit
custodians.'a 0 The opposite was true, however: "The judge, at Special
Term, expressly [said] 'that the child had been well taken care of.' "181
Moreover, the general term court had not based its decision on actual
examples of the unfitness of the Shakers.' 2 Instead, the general term
judge granted custody to Barbour "because of his belief that the welfare
of individuals, of families and of society depend upon cherishing and pre-
serving the family relation, and that the influence and tendency of the
Shaker institutions was to alienate the affections of the child from its
parents."'8 a  That belief, concluded the appellate court, was not
grounded in the record's examination of Shaker practices,' 8 4 which was
summarized in question-and-answer format in three pages with the
reporter's notes.1
8 5
In contrast to the cases in Massachusetts and New York, a more thor-
ough report of an examination into Shaker practices for the purpose of
deciding custody is found in a case from Ohio, State ex rel. Ball v.
Hand."6 In Ball, a Shaker father petitioned for habeas corpus for the
return of his two daughters, aged eight and six. The reporter's notes
indicate that Mr. Ball, a widower, along with his father abandoned the
girls and their paternal grandmother while "under the influence of Mil-
lerite excitement."' 8 7 Mrs. Ball, no longer able to care for the girls,
entrusted them to their maternal grandmother, Mrs. Hand. Although
Mr. Ball seemed satisfied with this arrangement initially, he petitioned to
gain custody of the girls after he joined a Shaker community.
The arguments made by counsel for both sides provide a doctrinal
summary of the status of American custody law. The father's attorneys
179. Id. at 45.
180. See id. at 46.
181. Id. at 47 (quoting People ex rel Barbour v. Gates, 57 Barb. 291, 296 (N.Y. App. Div.
1869)).
182. See id. at 47.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 41-44.
186. 5 WEST. L.J. 361 (Ohio Super. 1848).
187. The Millerite excitement, which began in the 1830s in northeastern New York, Vermont,
and western Massachusetts, was an enthusiastic movement of Christians who believed that Christ's
second coming would precede the end of the world in 1843 or 1844. See WHITNEY CROSS, THE
BURNED-OVER DISTRICT: THE SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF ENTHUSIASTIC
RELIGIONS IN WESTERN NEW YORK, 1800-1850 287-316 (1950). When the end of the world did
not transpire, the disappointed flocked to Shaker communities in New York and New England, "a
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recognized that English precedent had eroded the paternal presumption
of custody, and enabled a judge to exercise discretion to award custody
to someone other than a father in a given case.' 8 8 Yet they asserted that
a court was not permitted to divest a father of custody unless he is
proven "absolutely unfit to take charge of his child."' 9 "Shakerism,"
they argued, "is no ground for denying this man the custody of his
children. '""9
The attorneys for Mrs. Hand argued that the superior discretion of the
judge trumped the father's argument in favor of custody.' 9' Among the
cases cited in support of this proposition was Commonwealth v. Ham-
mond.' 92 Without recognizing the irony of appealing to a case where
Shakers won custody, counsel for Mrs. Hand argued that judicial discre-
tion had to be exercised to protect against Shaker religious practices.
Although "our Legislature has no right to make any religious principle a
ground for the loss of any civil privilege,"' 9a religious belief is respected
only "provided it works no injury to the state."' 94 The Shakers, they
reasoned, not only interfered with the state's duty to "foster and protect
the increase in population" by forbidding marriage and procreation, they
perpetuated their beliefs by teaching young children that procreation is a
sin.1
95
In deciding to allow the children to remain where they were, Judge
Johnson articulated a standard for determining when a child could be
removed from a father's custody. "[W]hen the father is grossly immoral,
intemperate, imbecile insane, or other-wise disqualified to discharge the
obligation of providing, the law will not enforce the right of custody." In
this case, the judge found Mr. Ball insane because he was not interested
in pursuing the " 'bonds of natural affection' ":
Stephen Ball ... does not seek these children that he may rekindle
the fire on his desolate hearth, and relink them around it in the fam-
ily circle. He does not seek them that he may rebuild his family
altar and unite with them in consecrating it with the prayers and
songs of family devotion. He seeks them that he may sever them
from the bosom of their grandmother, and from his own bosom, and
plant them in the cold ascetic bosoms of the "female care-takers,"
and transfer all his right, title and interest in the children which
God has given him, to total strangers. 196
188. Hand, 5 WEsT. L.J. at 363 (citing Lord Mansfield's dicta in Rex v. Deleval, 3 Burr 1434, 97
Eng. Rep. 913 (1763)).
189. Id. at 363.
190. Id. at 364.
191. Id. at 365.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 366.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 369.
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Neither Stephen Ball nor the Shakers satisfied the judge's notion of an
adequate parent. After questioning a member of the Shaker community
and, perhaps, reading Shaker writings,197 the judge observed that,
because the community would care for the girls, "the community of
Shakers is plaintiff to this suit."198 Yet, the community was no more
suitable than Mr. Ball because it required its members to dissolve the
natural bond of parent and child. 199
The difference between the Massachusetts cases on the one hand, and
the New York and Ohio cases on the other, in their examination of
Shaker practices, is more pointed when the legislative backdrop is added.
While the Massachusetts General Court made no effort to limit Shakers'
rights to custody, the legislatures in New York and Ohio did. In the
second edition of his treatise,2" Chancellor Kent reported that New
York had legislation that enabled a judge "upon habeas corpus [to]
recover and dispose of any child detained by the society of shakers
[sic]." 2 ° 1 The statute, passed on March 14, 1818,202 over the protests of
Thomas Jefferson and the Council of Revision, which included, among
others, Governor De Witt Clinton, Chancellor Kent, and Attorney Gen-
eral Martin Van Buren. They denounced it on the grounds that it inter-
fered with marriage and with the free exercise of religion.2 °3 The statute
had both a private and public component. It operated retroactively on
behalf of Eunice Chapman, a New York woman who had joined the
Watervliet community in 1811 with her husband and three children, and
was prevented from access to the children after she left.2"4 The first sec-
tion of the statute granted Eunice Chapman a divorce.20 The second
more general section operated as a remedy for women and for men. It
provided that a judge could issue a writ of habeas corpus to get children
"on application of the husband or wife not having joined the . . .
Shakers," authorized a sheriff's search of "the dwelling houses and other
buildings of the ... society" if the children were not produced, enabled
the judge to "award the charge and custody" to the non-Shaker par-
ent,2°" and criminalized the secreting of children by the Shakers.2 "7
The legal effect of the statute in custody cases, however, might not
197. Id. at 361-62.
198. Id. at 369.
199. Id. at 368.
200. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1832).
201. Id. at 194 n.c (quoting N.Y. REV. STAT. OF 1828, vol ii., part ii, ch. viii, title ii, at 148-49).
202. An Act for the Relief of Eunice Chapman, and for Other Purposes, 1818 N.Y. Laws, ch.
47, at 38.
203. See ANDREWS, THE PEOPLE, supra note 39, at 210-11.
204. See id. at 210 (noting that Mrs. Chapman had spent some time with the Shakers). But see
1818 N.Y. Laws, ch. 47, preamble, at 38 (implying that Mrs. Chapman had never joined the
community).
205. See 1818 New York Laws, ch. 47, § 1, at 38.
206. 1818 N.Y. Laws, ch. 47, § 2, at 38.
207. Id. at 39.
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have been significant. As the M'Dowle case indicates, habeas corpus
remedies were available at common law without the statute. The statute
did, however, formalize the process whereby a judge could use the habeas
proceeding to make a custody award. More important, however, was the
rhetorical effect of the statute and the debate that its passage generated.
The affect of the statute might have been to give more widespread
credence to the notion that Shakers were justifiably subject to scrutiny
for their child-rearing practices. The New York statute, by virtue of hav-
ing been cited by Kent, is cited by other treatise writers. For example,
William Forsyth's 1850 British treatise on custody disputes includes a
four-page summary of custody law in the United States. Forsyth quotes
directly from Kent's treatise for the proposition that fathers were not
always entitled to prevail over a third party in a custody dispute. 20° For-
syth also notes that Kent "mentions also that by the New York Revised
Statutes.. . the Chancellor or a Judge may, upon habeas corpus, recover
and dispose of any child detained by the society of Shakers.
' '2 °
Although the statute is cited to support the notion that custody was
increasingly granted to wives like Eunice Chapman in favor of their hus-
bands, the passage also implies that Shakers were not suitable custodians
for children.
The Ohio legislature enacted a statute on January 11, 1811, designed
to prevent Shakers from keeping children.210 The preamble to the statute
gives some indication of the disposition of the legislature:
[I]t is represented to the general assembly, that a sect of people in
this state, called and known by the name of Shakers, inculcate and
enjoin upon all who become attached to them, that they must lead a
life of celibacy, in consequence of which women have been aban-
doned by their husbands, robbed of their children, and left destitute
of the means of support.21
The statute, directed specifically against men who had left their wives to
join the Shakers, allowed a woman to petition the court for a share of
"the property real and personal of [her] husband.., as shall appear just
and equitable.212 The court could also deprive a father of "all the
authority he could have otherwise exercised over his children," give his
property to them, grant the mother the duty and right to care for the
children, appoint a guardian for them, or bind them as apprentices. 213
208. WILLIAM FORSYTH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO THE CUSTODY OF INFANTS,
IN CASES OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PARENTS OR GUARDIANS 8 (1850) (quoting KENT, supra note
200, at 194).
209. Id.
210. See ANDREWS, THE PEOPLE, supra note 39, at 207.
211. Id. at 13.
212. 1811 Ohio Laws, ch. 8, § 2, at 15.
213. 1811 Ohio Laws, ch. 8, § 4, at 15. The authority to bind children seems to have been a
remedy designed to take care of children whose father had no property to divide. See id. at 15 ("[If
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The cases that I have discussed in this section are considered impor-
tant to the development of the doctrine discussed in the beginning of Part
II because they demonstrate increasing judicial regard for the "best inter-
ests" of children.2" 4 Yet, the "best interests" analysis within them often
operated in favor of the Shakers. Indeed, except for Ball v. Hand, the
Shaker cases appear to counter the argument that judicial emphasis on
child nurture and development can be linked to judges' desires to foster
families that were "bound together by a new egalitarianism and affec-
tion" 215-two terms that had different meanings for Shakers than for
other families.
If Shakers had families that did not resemble the emerging nineteenth-
century ideal, why was it that they still satisfied the "best interests" test
and why, especially, did only Massachusetts courts not examine their
religious practices? In the next section, I look closely at the Harvard and
Shirley Shakers for the answer to those questions.
PART III: THE CASE OF LIONEL HOPKINS
The Shaker communities in Harvard and Shirley had a total of approx-
imately 250 members during the period between 1830 and 1860.216
Although the reliability of any statistics on Shaker population varies,
2 t7
it is probably safe to say that in the 1840s, the two communities repre-
sented at least 10 percent of the combined population of both towns.2" 8
In the 1840s, the two communities had approximately forty-five children
under the age of sixteen.21 9
In the two journals that I examined--one kept by Grove B. Blanchard,
the court shall deem it necessary, they may direct such child or children to be bound to
apprenticeship, agreeably to the sixth section of the act, entitled 'an act for the relief of the poor
. ..'). In his treatise, Edward Mansfield interpreted the statute as one which considered the
children of Shakers to be orphans. See EDWARD MANSFIELD, THE LEGAL RIGHTS, LIABILITIES
AND DUTIES OF WOMEN 344 (1845).
214. See, e.g., GROSSBERG, supra note 82, at 256 (discussing Hand to show that the rights of
natural parents were diluted once courts focused on child nurture); id. at 262 n.61 (citing M'Dowle,
Hammond and Curtis to support the assertion that the "best interests" of the child doctrine could
constrain masters and natural parents); Peter Bardaglio, Challenging Parental Custody Rights: The
Legal Reconstruction of Parenthood in the Nineteenth-Century American South, 4 CONTINUITY &
CHANGE 259, 263 n.17 (1989) (citing M'Dowle, Hammond, and Ball); Zinaldin, supra note 22, at
1057 n.67 (referring to M'Dowle as having laid the groundwork for New York's common law of
child custody); id. at 1059 n.73 (referring to Hammond as a "doctrinally significant" case); id. at
1077-78 (discussing Hammond and M'Dowle in depth).
215. GROSSBERG, supra note 82, at 8. See id. at 234-42 (noting custody law premised on
theories that children needed nurture reflected judge's notions that the family's purpose was to
enhance each individual's needs).
216. See BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, Eastern Demographic Characteristics, supra note 27,
at 217; DESROCHE, supra note 5, at 135 (citing an unpublished doctoral thesis).
217. See DESROCHE, AMERICAN SHAKERS, supra note 5, at 38 (discussing the reliability of a
variety of estimates of the populations of Shaker communities).
218. Massachusetts House Report No. 40, Statement of the Population of Each Town and City
in Mass., According to the United States Census of 1840, at 3, 4.
219. See BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, Census Data for Eastern Communities, supra note
27, at 233, 234; Harvard Sisters'Book, July 12, 1843 (indicating that there were 31 children in the
children's order); Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, February 29, 1844 (indicating that the Harvard
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the head of the Bishopric, and one kept by the office sisters of Harvard-
one child custody case occupied the most pages and a good deal of time
and attention. Although a number of entries in both journals during the
period between 1830 and 1845 mention custody disputes and court
appearances,22 ° the case of Lionel Hopkins is described in the greatest
detail.
On Monday, July 24, 1843, the Shirley Deacon, Jonas Nutting,
22'
brought Lionel to the Harvard community to "evade his mother.,
222
Lionel had been living with the Shirley community since the age of three,
and was "1 5 years and some odd months" when his mother tried to get
him back.223 Although the journals do not reveal Lionel's mother's mar-
ital status or her name, she was probably a widow, remarried to someone
other than Lionel's father. Although most of the journal entries indicate
that she was acting on her own,224 one entry does mention that Lionel
was unwilling to live with his mother and stepfather.
225
On Wednesday, July 26, a Harvard Brother named John Orsment
brought Lionel back to the Shirley community.226 During the two days
that Lionel spent in Harvard, "his mother made quite an uproar" in Shir-
ley." She convinced Shirley's Mayor Longley to go with her to the
offices of the Shirley community to look into the matter. According to
Grove Blanchard, "the Mayor decide[d] in our favor, admonishe[d] the
old woman for lying & she [went] away home.
'227
Lionel's mother was not to be discouraged that easily. On Saturday,
community had 15 boys under the age of 14); id, December 24, 1844 (indicating that the Harvard
community had 11 girls between the ages of five and 14).
220. See, e.g., Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, February 7, 1842 (describing a writ of attachment
issued for a note allegedly drawn by the Shakers); Harvard Sisters' Book, April 14, 1842 (mentioning
a court appearance in Lowell in the Lawrence case); Journal of Grove B Blanchard April 14, 1842
(same); id., April 28, 1842 (mentioning a court appearance in Worcester by Shirley Shakers in a
custody case involving Lucretia Brown); Harvard Sisters' Book, February 8, 1843 (mentioning a
court appearance in Worcester so that a 14 year-old boy named Samuel could chose a guardian);
Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, September 25, 1843 (describing a complaint sworn by the Shirley
Shakers against two kidnappers of a nine-year-old boy); Harvard Sisters' Book, September 28, 1843,
(indicating that the grand jury refused to return an indictment against the kidnappers); Journal of
Grove B. Blanchard, February 27, 1845 (describing depositions taken in the Lawrence case); id.,
December 20, 1845 (describing a letter received from a Lowell attorney on behalf of Abial Crosby
that alerted the Harvard Shakers of a suit to be filed for services Abial performed for the community
as a minor).
221. See HORGAN, supra note 2, at 101.
222. Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, July 24, 1843.
223. Harvard Sisters' Book, July 30, 1843.
224. See, e.g., Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, July 26, 1843 ("his mother made quite an uproar
at Shirley Village"); Harvard Sisters' Book, July 30, 1843 (noting that the summons required the
Shakers to "show cause why Lionel should not be given up to his mother").
225. See Journal of Grove B Blanchard, July 26, 1843. The journal entry actually states that
Lionel was unwilling to live with his "mother and Father-in-Law." The gentleman referred to was
probably Lionel's stepfather. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTnONARY 761 (J. Simpson & E. Weiner,
eds. 2d ed. 1989) (defining father-in-law as stepfather, and noting uses of that term by Charles
Dickens in 1838 and by George Eliot in 1876).
226. See Journal of Grove B Blanchard, July 26, 1843; Harvard Sisters' Book, July 26, 1843.
227. Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, July 26, 1843.
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July 29, Deacon Nutting went to Harvard to let the community there
know that the Shirley Shakers had been served with a writ of habeas
corpus.228 Sheriff Coburn from Boston served the writ, took Lionel, but
agreed to release him in the custody of Nutting in return for a bond.22 9
The summons required Elder Grove, Deacon Nutting, Samuel Barret,
and William Clark 230 to appear before Justice Wilde of the Supreme
Judicial Court, "on Monday noon next precisely,... to answer to the
alleged restraining of Lionel P. Hopkins."' 231  That afternoon, Nutting
went to see the community's lawyer in Groton, Esquire Farley.
232
The next day, at 4 p.m., the group left Harvard for Boston. Although
the Shakers usually traveled to Boston by oxcart, a trip taking two
days, 233 this matter was particularly urgent and the travelers arrived in
Cambridgeport at midnight.234 The next morning, they went into Boston
in time to meet with George Bancroft on Monday morning, July 31. Ban-
croft, who practiced in Boston, was Farley's son-in-law.2 35 Blanchard's
account of the day in court is quite descriptive:
[We] appeared before Judge Wilde at 12 o'clock, and except for an
intermission we were in close combat until sunset, when we were
discharged by the Court, and Lionel had his liberty to go with the
party he chose, but said the Judge, the ward said to me that it was
his mind to return and live with the Shakers in preference to going
with his mother and Father-in-Law .... [S]o a day of much labor
and toil has passed away, and probably others more serious await
US.
The next morning, the group went to the Middlesex Probate Court in
Cambridge. Lionel chose Deacon Nutting as his guardian, while Barret
and Clark put up the bond.236 They left Cambridgeport at 4:00 p.m. and
returned to Harvard by 10:00 p.m. that evening.237 On the 2nd of
August, Nutting and Blanchard held a meeting with the elders of the
Harvard community to relate the results of the proceedings. When the
meeting ended, Nutting and Hopkins returned to Shirley.238
228. See Harvard Sisters'Book, July 29, 1843.
229. See Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, July 29, 1843.
230. See id., July 30, 1843.
231. Id., July 29, 1843.
232. See id. Although the entry does not mention the lawyer's first name, it probably was
Benjamin Mark Farley. Farley graduated from Harvard in 1804, studied law with an attorney in
Leominster, and entered the bar in Hollis, New Hampshire. He practiced there and in Groton,
Massachusetts until 1855. He served as a state representative in New Hampshire for ten years
during the period between 1814-1829. See 1 WILLIAM DAVIS, BENCH AND BAR OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETrS 234 (1895 & photo. reprint 1974.).
233. See HORGAN, supra note 2, at 100.
234. See Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, July 30, 1843.
235. See id., July 31, 1843. George Bancroft studied with Benjamin Mark Farley and at the
Harvard Law School. See 2 DAvis, supra note 232, at 341.
236. See Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, August 1, 1843.
237. See Harvard Sisters' Book, August 2, 1843.
238. See Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, August 2, 1843.
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Although Blanchard's account is incomplete, Justice Wilde's decision
appears to have been made along the same lines as Justice Shaw's in Cur-
tis. Because Lionel was over fourteen, his preferences were determined
and respected. And while it is possible that his inquiry addressed the
Shakers' practices, it is likely that it did not; Blanchard's entries indicate
no remorse or frustration with the "world's" treatment of the Shakers
during the trial. On other occasions, his remarks about those who mis-
trusted the Shakers were quite candid. For example, he freely lamented
"the spirit of apostasy" that depressed the community in 1844.239 Two
things are clear from the account, however. First, the Shakers were able
to use informal legal processes to advance their case. The mayor who
turned away Lionel's mother and the sheriff who allowed them to post
bond were allies of the Shakers in this story. Second, the Shakers were
able to call upon a network of attorneys familiar with their practices.
Farley and his son-in-law were accessible at a moment's notice. What
the account does not demonstrate, however, is why Justice Wilde decided
the case the way that he did. The next part of this paper will address that
issue.
PART IV: EXPLAINING THE SUCCESSES OF THE HARVARD AND
SHIRLEY SHAKERS
To explain the reason for the particular successes of a nineteenth-cen-
tury Shaker community, one must begin by confronting a methodological
problem inherent in examining any group. Should the historical exami-
nation begin with the premise that the group was part of mainstream
culture or separate from it?2" The answer to that question is especially
important if one is trying to assess the impact of Shakers on legal doc-
trine or the impact of legal doctrine on the Shakers. For, if the Shakers
were, indeed, no different than other religious groups of the period, one
might be tempted to conclude that the relationship between Shakers and
the law was no different than the relationship of other groups to the
law.24" ' If on the other hand, Shakers were a deviant religious group by
nineteenth-century standards, then their influence on the law or the law's
239. Id., June 5, 1844.
240. See R. Laurence Moore, Insiders and Outsiders in American Historical Narrative and
American History, 87 AM. HIsT. REV. 390, 391 (1982) (arguing that the historian's decision to
classify a group as outside the mainstream, unless conscious of the ambiguities inherent in such a
classification, perpetuates narratives that variously focus on the outsider as victim or as an agent of
social change); Carol Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and
Religious Authority, 26 J. FAM. L. 741, 744-45 & n.7 (1987-1988) [hereinafter Weisbrod, Family,
Church and State].
241. This is especially true if one subscribes to the view that the law most readily reflects the
interests of those with the ability to manipulate it. See Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36
STAN. L. REV. 57, 71-75 (1984) (describing two common approaches in contemporary legal history,
which posit that the law evolves to reflect the needs of interest groups with power).
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influence on them could be easily dismissed as negligible,"' or as operat-
ing through channels not necessarily associated with traditional legal
institutions.243
Labeling the Shakers as either deviant or as mainstream seems simplis-
tic, but happens often. Put in other words, no one claims kinship with
the Shakers and everyone does. In the afterword to A Maggot, his 1985
fictionalized account of the origins of Shaker theology, British author
John Fowles describes the first phenomenon, which has led to a dismissal
of Shaker contributions:
Orthodox theologians have always despised the sect's doctrinal
naivety; orthodox priests, its fanaticism; orthodox capitalists, its
communism; orthodox communists, its superstition; orthodox sen-
sualists, its abhorrence of the carnal; and orthodox males, its strik-
ing feminism. 2 "
In contrast to the marginalization of Shaker contributions, other
approaches romanticize their role in the nineteenth century and focus on
their importance in creating a unique American architectural, craft, and
lifestyle idiom. 24 - The fact that Shakers appear to straddle the main-
stream and the periphery of nineteenth-century society and historical
inquiry is part of their appeal.2'
It should be of no surprise, then, that the law could also render the
Shakers simultaneously mainstream and peripheral. As shown above,
courts could focus on or ignore those aspects of Shaker practice that were
peculiar even in the nineteenth century. Massachusetts courts in the cus-
tody cases ignored them, applying doctrine without regard to Shaker
practices or theology. In this Part of the paper, I will offer and examine
four hypotheses to explain why courts in Massachusetts were willing to
grant Shakers custody of children without conducting an overt inquiry
into the practices of the sect. Those hypotheses rely on 1) the principle
of "freedom of contract," 2) the belief in the separation of Church and
242. See Stein, supra note 9, at 750 (indicating that the Shakers' involvement with courts and
legislatures had "no significant" impact on their doctrine or practice).
243. See Minow, supra note 21, at 885-90 (suggesting that despite barriers imposed by a
dominant legal culture, a group can assert its own social norm, ultimately restructuring the legal
universe).
244. JOHN FOWLES, A MAGGOT 450 (1985).
245. See, e.g., DORIS FABER, THE PERFECT LIFE: THE SHAKERS IN AMERICA 61 (1974) ("The
Shaker emphasis on a simple rural life style as the ideal defense against worldly evil could appeal
equally to Thomas Jefferson and to readers of the WHOLE EARTH CATALOGUE"); Serene Style,
ELLE, March 1989, at 307 (featuring Shaker furniture photographed with contemporary models
wearing clothing "as comfortable and classic as a well-wrought piece of Shaker furniture"); Simple
Gifts, Boston Globe (special section on travel), March 12, 1989, at 18 (describing the Shaker
Community in Canterbury, New Hampshire).
246. Edward Andrews's comments are typical of those intrigued by the contradictions that a'
twentieth century mind perceives in the Shaker world: "The more one dwells upon the subject, the
more surprising it seems that a people who had segregated themselves from the world and who held
spiritual blessedness as the summum bonum should have developed such an amazingly progressive
economic system." ANDREWS, COMMUNITY INDUSTRIES, supra note 6, at 37.
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State, 3) the recognized need for social institutions to care for homeless
children, and 4) the way the Shakers interacted with the legal
infrastructure.
A. The Shakers and "Freedom of Contract"
The first hypothesis suggests that Shakers were successful in retaining
custody of children in Massachusetts because courts, respecting the con-
tractual underpinnings of indenture agreements, were loathe to interfere
with contractual freedom when economic interests were at stake. If
judges viewed indenture agreements as variations of employer and
employee contracts,2 47 then by upholding indenture agreements, even
when they may have been improperly executed, courts were protecting
the interests of masters over the interests of either their apprentices or
their parents.248
This interpretation depends upon accepting a number of other prem-
ises, however, which may be impossible to verify or may be too strained
to be credible. First, the judges would have had to view the commercial
interests of the Harvard and Shirley Shakers as deserving this degree of
accommodation.249 Second, the "best interest" inquiry of the entire
court in Hammond, of Justice Wilde in Lionel Hopkins' case, and of
Justice Shaw in Curtis would have to be viewed as an attempt to "hide
the ball." The analysis would require accepting that each judge went
only as far into the background of the Shakers as was necessary to justify
the award of custody, but no further. But, because the reported opinions
do not mention that the issue was brought up by opposing counsel,
attributing the lack of inquiry to the judges may be inappropriate; the
real question is why the lawyers on the opposing side did not raise the
issue, as they did in other states.25
Finally, this interpretation would require ascribing an importance to
indenture agreements that is contrary to the prevailing view that by the
mid- 1850s the apprentice system was declining in importance and useful-
ness in a society in which children were offered opportunities for employ-
ment in factories as unskilled laborers. 25' Even a second explanation for
247. See GROSSBERG, supra note 82, at 262-63 (discussing the nineteenth-century shift in the
character of apprenticeships from a domestic-centered institution to a wage-labor institution).
248. See MORTON HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 186-88
(1977).
249. The Harvard Shakers certainly believed that their economic interests were deserving of
special consideration from at least the state legislature. Simon Atherton, a trustee of the Harvard
community for 50 years before his death in 1883 "spent two days a week at the state capitol during
the decades of his trusteeship looking after the community's business interests." HORGAN, supra
note 2, at 105.
250. See supra, Part II.
251. See Michael Katz, The Origins of Public Education: A Reassessment, in THE SOCIAL
HISTORY OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 91, 106 (B. Edward McClellan & William Reese eds., 1988)
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the decrease in the popularity of indentures counters this hypothesis. If
indentures became less popular because courts, increasingly concerned
with the welfare of children, bound masters to care for and nurture the
best interests of their charges, 252 courts would also be free to use the
"best interests" of the child standard to strip a master of his control of an
apprentice. Not only could a court refuse to issue the writ to the master,
forcing him to rely on contract or tort actions, but a court could also
refuse to grant custody even if it did issue the writ, electing instead to
allow the apprentice to choose.25a
B. Separation of Church and State
Although the three Massachusetts cases did not raise issues related to
the Shakers' religious practices, the religious backdrop of antebellum
society may have influenced the way cases were resolved. This second
hypothesis suggests that Massachusetts judges had no need to inquire
into the child-rearing practices of the Shakers because they recognized
the Shakers as a bona fide Protestant sect.
Until 1833, Massachusetts had "a system that has often been described
as an 'establishment.' ",254 Under this system, churches existed in a par-
ish, which was a municipal unit of the town. In the years prior to the
enactment of the Massachusetts Constitution, a series of statutes entitled
a parish's Congregational church to the tax dollars of every resident
within the parish.255 The statutory scheme made some provisions for the
formation of new parishes that would be approved by town officials,
256
authorized parish tax collectors to refund the taxes collected from Angli-
cans,25 and allowed Quakers and Baptists to petition for exemptions.258
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 attempted "to minimize any
possible opposition to the entire constitution, [and] attempted to satisfy
the conservatives who sought security for the status quo, as well as the
increasingly vocal advocates of a voluntary religious system. ' 259 Article
II of the constitution gave the inhabitants of the Commonwealth "the
right... to worship the Supreme Being" in a manner "most agreeable to
the dictates of his own conscience." 2" In seeming contradiction, the
constitution also authorized the legislature to require towns "to make
suitable provision ... for the support and maintenance of public Protes-
252. See GROSSBERG, supra note 82, at 261-62.
253. See HURD, supra note 90, at 549-54, 557 (citing People ex reL Fowler v. Pillow, 1 Sand. 672
(N.Y. Super. Ct. 1849)).
254. John Cushing, Notes on Disestablishment in Massachusetts, 26 WM. & MARY Q. 169, 169
(1969).
255. See id. at 169-70.
256. See id. at 170 n.4.
257. See id at 171.
258. See id.
259. Id. at 172 (emphasis in the original).
260. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. II.
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tant teachers of piety, religion, and morality."26' For dissenters, the con-
stitution allowed an individual's tax dollars to be used for the support of
ministers of his own sect.
262
The effect of the constitutional provisions on dissenting churches was
in some respects worse than the prior regime. "Baptists and Quakers,
who previously enjoyed an exemption from religious taxes, came within
the revised system, against their conscientious objections. They were
forced to pay taxes for the support of their own worship. 2 6a And if they
wanted to receive their share of taxes, the Supreme Judicial Court's deci-
sion in Barnes v. Town of Falmouth forced them to incorporate,2 64 an act
that was contrary to the dissenters' beliefs that the state could not con-
trol a religion 265 and that a ministerial hierarchy was not necessary for
each individual to achieve salvation. 266
A statute was passed in 1811 to provide relief from the requirement of
incorporation. 267 It also allowed an individual to pay for the support of a
minister to an unincorporated religious society and authorized the soci-
ety to hold the funds.2 6' The 1811 statute was important to the Shakers
because it allowed the Supreme Judicial Court to recognize their capacity
to hold property by deed. Although Levy notes that "Shaker . . .
churches received the advantage of incorporation by the state legisla-
ture, '2 69 the Harvard and Shirley Shakers were not incorporated. Conse-
quently, the statute was crucial to their success in two property cases,
both titled Lawrence v. Fletcher.270
In 1826, George Lawrence, a Littleton landowner, conveyed property
to Pliny Blanchard with a mortgage deed to secure payment of a note.271
Blanchard, a member of the Harvard community, deeded his interests in
the property to two trustees of the Society in 1830.272 In 1834, Lawrence
gave possession of the land to Jonathan Chandler and Hosea Winchester,
trustees of the Society, for the purposes of foreclosing. 273 During the
next two years, however, Lawrence made payments on the note.27 4 In
March 1840, the Society sold the property to John Fletcher. 275 At trial,
261. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. III.
262. See id.
263. LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 28 (1986) [hereinafter LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE].
264. 6 Mass. 401 (1810).
265. See LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, supra note 263, at 31.
266. See WILLIAM MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
255 (1986).
267. See Act of June 18, 1811, 1811 Mass. Acts, ch. 6, at 388.
268. See id.
269. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, supra note 263, at 32.
270. 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 153 (1844); 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 344 (1845).
271. See Lawrence v. Fletcher, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) at 158.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See id. at 159.
275. See id. at 159-60.
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Lawrence claimed that the foreclosure had been invalid.
In the first decision on the case, Justice Hubbard remanded in order to
determine whether facts would support the conclusion that the foreclo-
sure by Chandler and Winchester had been effective or whether the pay-
ments by Lawrence to them "opened" the mortgage.276 In the second
opinion, he concluded that the payments were merely interest, and that
Fletcher had taken the property free from any claim by Lawrence. 7
More importantly, however, the first opinion solidified the status of the
Shakers.
Justice Hubbard noted that the first question was whether Blanchard's
deed to the Society was a valid one.278 Lawrence claimed that the con-
veyance had not been specifically made to individuals who were deacons
of a church,279 and that the Shakers were "merely a voluntary associa-
tion, not constituted into a religious society according to any known laws
or usages of the Commonwealth.1 2 0 The justice rejected the argument.
After examining the Shaker's covenants of 1791, 1801, and 1814, he con-
cluded that the Society was constituted as "a sect or denomination of
[C]hristians, ' '281 entitled by the statute of 1811, "if not legally empow-
ered before, ' 28 2 to "elect deacons or trustees to take and hold and man-
age the property of the community.
2 83
The opinion, in effect, treated the Shakers as just another church
engaged in a property dispute, and Massachusetts courts were quite
familiar with such cases. Church property disputes involved a great deal
of the courts' attention during the period between 1820 and 1840. The
schism in the Congregational church between Unitarians and Trinitari-
ans was the occasion for many cases in which the Supreme Judicial Court
was forced to decide whether members of a seceding orthodox church
was entitled to take church property when it left the existing parish to
form a new one.28 4 One effect of the schism was to realign political alli-
ances within Massachusetts; Trinitarians, who regularly lost church
property in these cases to Unitarians, joined with Baptists to rally for
disestablishment of religion. 28" By 1833, they had succeeded in securing
an amendment to the state constitution to disestablish churches.28 6
Whether the Lawrence cases had more than symbolic effect is hard to
assess. The argument that state law implicitly recognized the Shakers as
276. See Lawrence v. Fletcher, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) at 164.
277. See Lawrence v. Fletcher, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) at 348.
278. See Lawrence v. Fletcher, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) at 161.
279. See id. at 161-62.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 162.
282. Id. at 163.
283. Id.
284. See LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, $supra note 263, at 33-37.
285. Id. at 36-37.
286. Act of April 1, 1834, 1834 Mass. Acts, ch. 183, at 34.
1992]
33
Schneider: Prayers for Our Protection and Prosperity at Court
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1992
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
a legitimate group, like the explanation related to indentures described
above, does not account for the absence of argument made by the
Shakers' opponents that the Shakers were not the best caregivers for chil-
dren. Opponents could have argued that Shakers were not a legitimate
group for the purposes of receiving children even if they were legitimate
for the purposes of taking property. Second, at least until 1833, the
Supreme Judicial Court inquired into religious belief, at least to deter-
mine if an individual should be convicted of blasphemy. In that year the
court affirmed the conviction for blasphemy of Abner Kneeland, a
freethinking heretic writer who denounced prayer, God, the Bible, and
the immaculate conception, in his publication, the Investigator.2" 7 Dur-
ing the first of his four trials, the prosecutor argued that "[b]lasphemy
... was but one part of the system introduced by the disciples of Owen
and Wright. Not only was atheism to be enthroned, but moral restraints
removed, illicit sexual relations encouraged, the laws of property
repealed, and the horrible experiments of New Harmony and Nashoba
introduced in Boston itself.
288
In his opinion affirming Kneeland's conviction at his last trial, Justice
Shaw specifically found no contradiction between the crime of blasphemy
and the state's constitution. Not only was blasphemy a common law
crime that existed apart from the constitution, it was a crime that was
designed to punish acts that would incite the public.2 89 Although from
this brief description of Kneeland's views it is somewhat clear that
Shaker beliefs were slightly more mainstream than Kneeland's, there
might have been ways for courts to construe the religious freedoms that
were narrowly guaranteed in the Commonwealth.
The Kneeland case also demonstrates something else. The opinion
was highly criticized by Boston intellectuals who were concerned with
the case's implications for freedom of expression. "Almost all who were
given to heterodox ideas-utopians, abolitionists, transcendentalists-
balked at using the strong arm of the state to silence Kneeland."' 29 The
dissatisfaction with the opinion led to an unsuccessful petition for Knee-
land's pardon, which was signed by reformers like Alcott, Emerson, Gar-
rison, and Ripley.291 Although it is impossible to tell whether Justice
Shaw took the criticism to heart, and whether it had any effect on his
opinion in Curtis, the convergence of intellectual opinion on the case
demonstrates the degree to which alternative social and religious
arrangements captured the attention of intellectuals. This idea will be
287. See LEONARD LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 43-
45 (1970).
288. Id. at 47.
289. See id. at 53-54.
290. Id. at 51.
291. See id. at 57.
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explored more fully in the discussion of the Shakers' interactions with
the legal infrastructure.
C The Social Service Role Played by the Shakers
During the early years of the nineteenth century, cities and towns in
Massachusetts were faced with a dilemma posed by the numbers of
truants and runaways who roamed the state unsupervised.292 Many chil-
dren came to the communities outside Boston from the rural parts of
western Massachusetts, attracted to the factory jobs in the newly indus-
trialized cities.29 Often, however, the labor force had no use for these
children.294 Consequently, children were found "on almost every street
corner."'295 Although social commentators counseled that the futures of
these children were directly dependent upon the quality of care and
attention that they received,296 the solution to the problem of itinerant
children was less than obvious.
Indentures secured by towns, a traditional solution, were no longer
effective substitutes for parental control. Not only were indentures with
artisans less available,297 but those that were available required place-
ment in "industrial settings that were neither educational nor, indeed,
safe."'2 98 Almshouses seemed unacceptable because they forced children
to live in close proximity to the basest elements of society. Because town
selectmen and overseers of the poor used almshouses to hide from the
rest of society "the most degraded tramps, drunkards, prostitutes, petty
criminals, and the victims of venereal disease, '299 "[i]t was impossible to
remove begging and thieving children from the streets because there was
no receptacle, other than the almshouses, in which to put them. ' '3°"
The state gradually began to intervene and provide for unattached
292. See Katz, Public Education, supra note 251, at 96; Libertoff, supra note 251, at 155-56.
293. See Libertoff, supra note 251, at 156.
294. See Katz, Public Education, supra note 251, at 106; Libertoff, supra note 251, at 156-57.
295. Libertoff, supra note 251, at 156.
296. See, eg., HOUSE Doc. No. 46 of 1820 (noting that the ultimate direction of a child's life
"may be happy or miserable, honorable or disgraceful, according to the specific nature of the
provision made for their support and education"); GRIOG, supra note 15, at 53 (arguing that the
overseers of the poor of Newburyport, Massachusetts, placed children outside of almshouses because
"children growing up there would not receive the vocational or moral and religious instruction
necessary to make them productive and contented adults").
297. See supra notes 251-253, and accompanying text.
298. Teitelbaum, Family History, supra note 109, at 1150.
299. ROBERT KELSO, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC POOR RELIEF IN MASSACHUSETfS: 1620-1920
173 (1969 ed.); see also GRIGG, supra note 15, at 13-14, 51 (describing an analysis of the
demographic data on admission rates showing how the overseers of the poor of the town of
Newburyport, Massachusetts, used the town almshouse to discipline men in the first quarter of the
nineteenth century).
300. KELSO supra note 299, at 172. This is not an uncontested conclusion. In his book, Michael
Katz argues that the movement of children out of poorhouses did not occur until the last quarter of
the century. See MICHAEL KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 103-04 [hereinafter KATZ, IN THE SHADOW]. Katz also suggests that the
Quincy report of 1821, which Kelso relied upon for his conclusion that Massachusetts policymakers
recognized the need for keeping children out of poorhouses, actually fostered the notion that
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children by controlling child labor and requiring education.30 1 Social
commentators during the second quarter of the century believed that
schooling "would provide the lower-class child with an alternative envi-
ronment and a superior set of adult models. '30 2 Schooling would also
alleviate the harms that both wage labor and factory work would have on
children during the early period of industrialization.3 °3 In a system
based on wage labor, children would suffer indirectly as "chronic under-
employment became a permanent institution, ' ' 3°  creating mobile fami-
lies with few ties to neighbors and communities.30 5  By working in
factories, children would be directly impaired by unsanitary and unsafe
working conditions.3"6
Yet, although Massachusetts enacted the country's first compulsory
school attendance law in 1852 in response to the educational reform
movement that had begun in the 1830s, 3°7 only a small number of poor
and immigrant youths participated.30 8 Moreover, Massachusetts did not
pass laws that regulated the hours during which a child could work in a
factory until the second half of the century.
The Shaker lifestyle might have been viewed as a "private sector"
alternative for displaced children that had none of the drawbacks of
almshouses and that had added economic benefits from the perspective of
town officials.310 This possibility also fits with the prescriptive vision of
the nineteenth-century family that was fostered by contemporary sociolo-
gists in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The reformists who
bemoaned the egalitarian family produced by companionate marriages,
children belonged there. See id at 23. Reconciling Kelso and Katz is not easy, but both can be
correct.
The Quincy report may have implied that children did not belong in almshouses, but in
specialized institutions. This seems in keeping with the trends in other states during the 1820s and
1830s. See DAVID ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 190, 206-07, 209 (1971). If a town did not have a large population of poor
with differing needs, however, it would not have had a number of specialized institutions. See id. at
183. Consequently, there may have been reluctance to put children with adults in the existing
poorhouse. Katz provides another way of rationalizing the two explanations by suggesting that "it is
difficult to believe that even in these early years the picture was quite as cheery as poor law reformers
would have had their contemporaries believe." KATZ, IN THE SHADOW, supra at 24.
301. See Libertoff, supra note 251, at 156.
302. Katz, Public Education, supra note 251, at 103.
303. See RELIGION AND EDUCATION IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 5 (H. Kliebard
ed. 1969) (describing Horace Mann's theory that common schools would be a "basis for an effective
attack on poverty, crime and social conflict.") [hereinafter referred to as RELIGION AND
EDUCATION IN AMERICA].
304. Katz, Public Education, supra note 251, at 102.
305. See id.
306. See KATZ, IN THE SHADOW, supra note 300, at 130-31.
307. See id. at 130.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 133 (describing a Massachusetts law of 1867 that required factory inspections and
a law of 1888 that prohibited night work by children).
310. See GRIGG, supra note 15, at 59-66 (suggesting that the overseers of the poor in
Newburyport, Massachusetts, attempted to place children with families at no cost to the town, and
that placements with Shakers were of this sort).
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where husbands and wives formed loving relationships rather than eco-
nomic units, suggested that the family would be healthiest in a rural envi-
ronment that remained "patriarchical, organized under the authority of
the father." ' The "wholesome" nature of the work in Shaker commu-
nities would prepare children for adulthood and protect them from the ill
effects of industrialization.312 When they were not in school, Shaker chil-
dren were expected to contribute to the family welfare by learning crafts
skills or by assisting with agricultural chores. 3  As the apostasy rates in
communities increased after the 1840s despite the fact that more and
more children were entering them,1 4 Massachusetts may have looked
even more favorably on the training that Shakers offered because those
who would eventually leave the sect might be expected to become more
productive members of the greater society by virtue of their training.
The Shakers' schools, which were administered by a superintendent
from the Central Ministry, also emphasized usefulness. 15 As a result,
the educational level throughout the Society was probably only "profi-
cient, perhaps above the average for its time and place. ' 316 But both the
towns of Harvard and Shirley seem to have respected the Shaker schools.
By 1811, Shirley gave the Shaker community a share of the town's school
money for the operation of the Shakers' school,317 District 7.3I8 Indeed,
one elder from each community served on their respective School Com-
mittee during the middle years of the century.319
When there was conflict with secular authorities in Massachusetts over
Shaker schools, the dispute did not center on their quality, but on the
extent to which the state could support a sectarian education or interfere
with a religious group's schools. The move to purge sectarian influences
from Massachusetts' common schools was spearheaded by Horace
Mann, the state's first secretary of education. 320 Because Mann strongly
supported moral education, however, he was not in favor of removing all
religious instruction from the schools.32 1 Consequently, he developed a
311. Ronald Howard, Conceptions and Attitudes About the Family in Nineteenth-Century
America, in A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY SOCIOLOGY, 1865-1940 18 (John Mogey
ed., 1981).
312. Cf. HOWARD SEGAL, TECHNOLOGICAL UTOPIANISM IN AMERICAN CULTURE 94-97 &
n.77 (1985) (suggesting that the crafts, light industry, and manufacturing enterprises of nineteenth-
century utopian communities mediated between technological and pastoral visions of society).
313. See BREWER, SHAKER COMMUNITIES, supra note 27, at 77.
314. See id at 147-48 (noting that although the New Lebanon Church family admitted more
children during the years between 1841 and 1860 than during the years between 1787 and 1839,
there was little success in keeping most children).
315. See id. at 75.
316. ANDREWS, THE PEOPLE, supra note 39, at 194.
317. See id. at 66.
318. HORGAN, supra note 2, at 69.
319. See id. at 105, 119.
320. See RELIGION AND EDUCATION IN AMERICA, supra note 303, at 6.
321. See WILLIAM DUNN, WHAT HAPPENED TO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION? 138 (1958 & photo.
reprint 1983); NEIL MCCLUSKEY, PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND MORAL EDUCATION 42-43 (1958)
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theory of "common core" education that took the major elements of
Christianity as the basis for a program of religious instruction in the
schools.322 In 1841, Mann warned the Harvard and Shirley Shakers,
who refused to have their teachers examined or to permit the local com-
mittee to visit, that they would have to accept secular supervision of their
schools.323 The nature of Mann's warning was to point out the slippery
slope which would be trodden if "the example of these little homogene-
ous communities followed in towns where there were divisions in
creeds.'324  Evidence suggests, however, that at least the Harvard
Shakers were successful in deflecting too much inquiry. A series of
entries in the Harvard Sisters' Book gives some sense of the Shakers'
attitude toward the dispute. In November 1840, the community
included sixteen boys and eight girls. On December 21, 1840, the boys'
school began with a class of twenty-two students. 325 A member of the
Town of Harvard's school committee visited the community in January,
and told the Shakers that if they did not conform their classes to state
requirements, "he was authorized to employ a master to teach it."
326
The school committee member returned to the community in February
with a teacher, but the Shaker leaders politely rejected assistance,327 and
continued with their educational plan for the year. The girls' school
began, as scheduled, on July 5, 1841, under the supervision of a commu-
nity member.328 It also began again in the following year on June 27.329
To understand why the historical record does not include an account
of Shaker acquiescence to state mandates or of state enforcement of
them, I turn to the final hypothesis.
D. The Legal Sophistication of the Shakers
The final hypothesis, and the one that appears most plausible, suggests
a way to integrate the explanations offered above: Massachusetts courts
did not inquire into the child rearing practices of the Shakers because the
Shakers of Harvard and Shirley, through their contacts with mainstream
legal culture, insulated those practices from judicial scrutiny. The
courts, although familiar with the unconventional customs of the
(describing Mann's belief that moral education was needed to teach duties to fellow men and that
religious education was needed to teach duties to God).
322. See MCCLUSKEY, supra note 321, at 35-46.
323. See RAYMOND CULVER, HORACE MANN AND RELIGION IN THE MASSACHUSETrs
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 162 (1929).
324. Id.
325. See Harvard Sisters' Book, December 21, 1840. Shaker communities usually had one
schoolhouse that was used by the girls in the summer and by the boys in the winter. See BREWER,
SHAKER COMMUNITIES, supra note 27, at 75.
326. Harvard Sisters' Book, January 26, 1841.
327. See id., February 1, 1841 ("[Tlhey were informed that we did not wish for any of their
assistance, so they returned home.").
328. See id., July 5, 1841.
329. See id., June 27, 1842.
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Shakers, presumed that they would be suitable guardians for children in
need of care.
The Shakers, in general, recognized the constraints and demands of
the legal system, and modified their practices to respond to doctrinal
changes.330 Changes to community covenants occurred regularly, and
"were designed to meet a specific legal objection to Shaker practices that
had been encountered in various states. ' 331 Evidence of this is apparent
by comparing the Harvard community's first covenant with its fourth
covenant. The provision relating to children in the first covenant, signed
in 1797, provided that
youth and children under age are not to be received under the
immediate care and government of the Church, but by the request
or free consent of both their Parents if living; except they were left
by one of their Parents to the care of the other. Then by the request
or free consent of that parent; and if the child have no parents, then
by the request or free consent of such person or persons as may have
just and lawful right, in care of the child, together with the child's
own desire.332
The covenant signed in 1831 contained two provisions relating to chil-
dren. In the first, children were absolutely forbidden from membership
in the community-a provision not found in the first covenant.33 3 The
section which amended the one reproduced above included specific direc-
tives "Concerning Youth and Children":
Youth and children, being minors, cannot be received as members of
the Church professing a consecrated interest, in a united capacity;
yet it is agreed that they may be received under the immediate care
and government of the Church, at the desire or consent of such per-
son, or persons, as have a lawful right to, or control of such minors,
together with their own desire or consent. But, no minor under the
care of the Church can be employed therein for wages of any
kind.
3 34
Although there were interim changes between the 1790 covenant and
the 1831 covenant, 335 it is worth comparing the two covenants in three
330. See WEISBROD, BOUNDARIES, supra note 9, at 118 (suggesting that Shakers tried to
structure their internal relations so as to "not invoke the civil law if it could be avoided").
331. Stein, supra note 9, at 748.
332. First Covenant of the Harvard Community Covenant art. iv (1797).
333. See Fourth Covenant of the Harvard Community art. II, § 2 (1831).
334. Id. at § 5.
335. An undated addendum, signed between 1797 and 1814, specified that deacons would
"secure the rights, privileges and property of the Church, before all Courts and jurors of men."
Second Covenant of the Harvard Community (undated). The reporter's notes in Lawrence v.
Fletcher, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 153 (1844), suggest that this covenant was signed in 1801. See id. at 157
("At a meeting of the church on the 2d of March 1801, they chose deacons and a clerk, and all
members, by a writing under their hands and seals, agreed among other things, that the deacons and
their successors in office should hold the property of said church and have the management of all its
temporal concerns."). An 1814 covenant added a provision authorizing probationary families and
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respects. First, while the earlier one embodies a hierarchical notion of
who can give consent to leaving a child in the care of Shakers-first both
parents, then one parent if that parent has custody, then finally, a third
party-the later covenant evidences a broader notion of who can give
consent-anyone who has de jure or de facto control over the child. Sec-
ond, the later covenant forbids employing children-a provision that
might make the Shakers appear charitable rather than mercenary in the
eyes of someone reading the covenant. Finally, the later covenant
requires that a child express his or her preference or give consent. The
consent provision implies agreement after disclosure, which mirrors the
provision added to the covenant that required that it be read out loud for
the new convert to insure full comprehension of its terms.
336
As one commentator who examined the Hancock community's cove-
nant provision that required its signer to release private claims to prop-
erty upon departure from a community has noted, "[a] more complete
release of all claims could be imagined only by a contracts specialist or a
law professor. '337 The effect of similarly particularized and legalistic
language in the sections relating to children may have forestalled inquiry
into their suitability as child rearers. By embracing the rhetoric of child
welfare and including a provision for the determination of the child's
own will, the Shakers gave credibility to their claims when the covenant
was reviewed by a court.338
But because the covenant was the same for all communities, something
else must differentiate the Harvard and Shirley Shakers from those in
New York and Ohio. One explanation is suggested by a model offered by
Professor Weisbrod for explaining a religious group's decision to invoke
the law, which divides such cases into two categories. The goal of litiga-
tion in the first category of cases is to persuade the state to adopt a reli-
gious practice as the societal one. The goal of litigation in the second
category of cases is to establish a realm in which the religious group can
act without state interference. Professor Weisbrod points out that the
two categories reinforce one another. By allowing a religious group to
assert its influence without interference, the practices of that religious
group are elevated by secular authorities. Similarly, when a religious
group attempts to exert its influence to control prevailing societal prac-
requiring a community member to provide for a departing spouse. See Third Covenant of the
Harvard Community (1814).
336. See Fourth Covenant of the Harvard Community art. i., § 4 (1831).
337. Stein, supra note 9, at 748.
338. Although Shaker covenants were not specifically addressed in either Hammond or Curtis,
the contents of the 1797, 1801, 1814, and 1831 covenants were stipulated to by the parties in
Lawrence v. Fletcher, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 153, 157 (1844). The covenant of 1831 was reprinted in the
case of Grosvenor v. United Society of Believers, 118 Mass. 78 (1875), a case in which the Supreme
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tices, it may be doing so in order to protect its own practices.3a 9
Seen in this light, successful interaction with the legal system, though
appearing to be driven by the Shakers' desire to protect themselves and
their separateness, had the effect of elevating the group's stature within
the larger society. Continued success in all types of litigation meant con-
tinued deference from courts in child custody cases. Constant failure
would undermine the community's position with respect to the world.
One example of the operative effect of this principle is suggested by the
fact that in the states where Shaker practices were subject to judicial
scrutiny, they were also subject to legislative scrutiny. In Massachusetts,
they were subject to neither; in fact, they were successful in a custody
suit at the very start of the century. In addition, they had succeeded in
convincing the Supreme Judicial Court that they were a bona fide reli-
gious sect and that they performed a needed social service function.
Combined with their legal acumen, these factors operated in favor of the
Shakers.
Even when they had no cases pending, the Shaker leaders of Harvard
and Shirley spent time with their lawyers to develop strategies concern-
ing the legal effects of their covenant and about the law in general. 34
The lawyers that the Shakers retained were well-respected and well-
known members of the bar. For example, Samuel Hoar, a Concord law-
yer who represented the Harvard Shakers in Commonwealth v. Ham-
mond,341 appeared in 92 of the 299 cases argued in front of the Supreme
Judicial Court's Middlesex Sessions from 1820 to 1829. Fifty-eight other
lawyers appeared in the remaining cases. 342 Hoar was also involved in
Massachusetts politics as a member of the Whig party. He served in the
Massachusetts Senate in 1826, 1832, and 1833, and in Congress in 1835
and 1836.
341
Shakers elsewhere also chose their counsel well. For example, to
respond to charges brought in 1848 before the New Hampshire legisla-
ture that they abused children, "[t]he Shakers, with their customary wis-
dom when dealing with the outside world, chose as their counsel three of
339. Weisbrod, Family, Church and State, supra note 240, at 746-50.
340. See Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, February 31, 1844 (describing a visit to attorney Samuel
Hoar and Ex-Judge Samuel Putnam to "learn something about Law"); id. February 27, 1845
(describing conference with attorney Benjamin Farley on whether or not to test the Harvard
covenant in court).
341. 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 274 (1830). Although it was not possible to find a definitive reference to
Samuel Hoar's representation of the Harvard Shakers in this matter, the reporter's notes in the
syllabus support the inference that the attorney for the Shakers was Hoar. Curiously, while the
attorney for the defendant is identified with his last name and with the initials of his first name, no
initials are needed to identify Hoar. Although Hoar's son also practiced law, he was not admitted to
the bar until 1849. See 2 DAVIS, supra note 232, at 257.
342. See GERARD GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER 58-59 (1979); see also WILLIAM MINOT,
MEMOIR OF THE HON. SAMUEL HOAR 5 (1862) (describing how Samuel Hoar succeeded in
breaking into the "monopolized ... business" of older Middlesex lawyers, so that by 1831, he "was
usually retained in every case of importance in his own county").
343. See 2 DAVIS, supra note 232, at 187.
1992]
41
Schneider: Prayers for Our Protection and Prosperity at Court
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1992
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
the ablest lawyers (all with legislative experience) then available," includ-
ing Brigadier General Franklin Pierce who had just returned from the
Mexican War. a4 Yet the differences between the positions of the
Harvard and Shirley Shakers and the New Hampshire Shakers is worth
noting. The latter employed well-known counsel when in the reactive
position of defending against attacks that put their religious and child-
rearing practices at issue. The former were able to use counsel prophy-
lactically to prevent such inquiries.
A second factor also distinguished the Harvard and Shirley Shakers'
choice of counsel from the choice made by the New Hampshire commu-
nities; although there is no direct evidence of Hoar's relationship with the
transcendentalist writers of Concord, the Harvard Shakers at least once
met with Emerson in Concord after a visit to Hoar,3 45 and Emerson vis-
ited the Harvard community often after 1842.11 His journals and note-
books reflect that he "found more and more in Shakerism that impressed
him. a1" This was especially true after one of his first cousins joined the
Harvard Shakers with her child in the early 1840s. 348 There were also
visits between the Shakers and their neighbor, Alcott,349 and articles
about the Harvard Shakers in the transcendentalist periodical, Dial.35°
The ties between the Shakers and the transcendentalists were personal,
but the roots of those ties trace to the expression of millennialism in the
second and third quarters of the century that had widespread appeal and
cultural implications.3a ' Emerson's writings reflected his own belief in
perfectibility, idealism, and mysticism-a belief that was shared by mil-
lennial religious groups like the Shakers352-although he would not have
agreed that the communal lifestyle of the Shakers was the best way to
achieve it.353 "Emerson's well-known 'optimism' is an excellent example
of a transcendentalist millennial awareness which was directed toward
living an ideal life in nineteenth-century America.
3 5 4
The fact that Shakers built a religious lifestyle around values that were
also reflected in Emerson's writings may have had some significance for
344. Richard Upton, Franklin Pierce and the Shakers-A Subchapter in a Struggle for Religious
Liberty, 23 HIsT. N.H. 3, 5 (1968).
345. See Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, February 27, 1845.
346. See Brewer, Emerson, Lane, and the Shakers, supra note 3, at 256.
347. See id. at 258.
348. See id. at 260.
349. See Journal of Grove B. Blanchard, August 14, 1843.
350. See Brewer, Emerson, Lane, and the Shakers, supra note 3, at 270.
351. See id. at 258.
352. See id. at 261 ("Much as Emerson believed that every man embodied the oversoul or
creative spirit within himself, the Shakers believed that individuals converted to the gospel of
Christ's second appearance experienced their own personal second comings.").
353. See id. at 257; John Flanagan, Emerson and Communism, 10 NEw ENG. Q. 243, 248-49,
253, 260 (1937) (noting that Emerson's theory of the individual will was the root of his pessimistic
opinions of Alcott's Fruitlands experiment and Ripley's Brook Farm community).
354. See James Guimond, Nineteenth Century American Millennial Experience, Part II, 13
SHAKER Q. 42, 49 (1973).
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their legal affairs. Given the role that members of the legal and literary
elite played in shaping cultural values of order, balance, and acceptable
behavior in antebellum Boston,355 Shakers could only benefit by associa-
tions that may have elevated their status or given them an aura of
respectability.
CONCLUSION
The traditional narrative of Shaker historians marks the beginning of
their decline with the drop in the populations of communities at the mid-




explaining the decline of the Shakers is as difficult as explaining their
rise.358 A number of factors were certainly at work.
Industrialization and the growth of commercial enterprise in the cities
provided economic opportunities to those in the substratum of society
who otherwise would have found a haven with the Shakers. As market
economies replaced subsistence economies, the opportunity to make
money "in an age apathetic in religion and negligent of the golden rule in
industry,"359 reinforced values that were antithetical to the communitar-
ian values embodied by the Shakers.
The market success of the Shakers and the extensive landholdings that
they acquired also contributed indirectly to their decline. As fewer mem-
bers were available to farm and care for orchards, hired help was
required to tend to Shaker holdings. This brought "the world into the
sanctum"'36 and diluted the separateness that formed an important theo-
logical underpinning of the sect-the very attribute that differentiated
the Shakers from the many other utopian communities that failed to
achieve even the Shakers' degree of permanence.
36'
355. See Alfred Konefsky, Law and Culture in Antebellum Boston, 40 STAN. L. REv 1119,1134,
1149 (1988).
356. See ANDREWS, COMMUNITY INDUSTRIES, supra note 6, at 261; DESROCHE, supra note 5,
at 96-97; HORGAN, supra note 2, at 110-37.
357. See Brewer, Demographic Features, supra note 11, at 33 (arguing that Shaker membership
was unstable as early as the 1820s).
358. Compare ANDREWS, COMMUNITY INDUSTRIES, supra note 6, at 261 (noting that the
causes of Shaker decline were "economic and social as well as purely religious") with Brewer,
Demographic Features, supra note 11, at 33 (noting that a "complex interaction of internal and
external ideological, social, economic, and demographic" change was at work).
For an interesting discussion of the role that the law played in speeding the decline of the Oneida
Community in New York, see Carol Weisbrod, On the Breakup of Oneida, 14 CONN. L. REv. 717
(1982).
359. ANDREWS, COMMUNITY INDUSTRIES, supra note 6, at 262. Industrialization also
decreased the demand for Shaker goods because products made outside the community could be
produced much more cheaply. See HORGAN, supra note 2, at 124. Because the quality of life was
often what attracted people to Shaker communities, see Brewer, Demographic Factors, supra note 11,
at 42, any real or perceived decrease in the economic viability of Shaker communities would deter
new members. See DESROCHE, supra note 5, at 113.
360. DESROCHE, supra note 5, at 113.
361. See generally NOYES, supra note 83, at 655 (noting that "earnest religion" countered the
tendency of communities to attract and become havens for those less likely to help them succeed).
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The final and common factor mentioned by all those who have consid-
ered the issue is that, by the end of the third quarter of the century,
Shakers were no longer able to fill their communities with children
because children were increasingly protected by other societal institu-
tions. 362 As one commentator has noted, although the nineteenth-cen-
tury family was considered a private refuge, "changes in the law of child
custody, in intent and result, expressed a strong public interest in child
rearing.
' '363
By their decisions in child custody cases, judges reinforced the notion
that American society would progress and improve only if American
children were reared well. Although parents were initially charged with
that responsibility, "[a]fter an initial burst of optimism that people would
themselves do what reason and political principle showed to be desirable,
political and legal leaders formed the view that official intervention and
direction was necessary." 3 ' In Massachusetts, therefore, state govern-
ment, reflecting the concern for child welfare that was fostered in part by
judicial decisions, assumed a greater role in caring for the state's depen-
dent children.
3 65
In the early part of the century, that concern was manifested in the
transformation of the local poorhouse, which had always been a refuge
for any and all types of outcasts, into a variety of specialized institutions
geared to meet the needs of specific populations, such as the deaf, the
blind, the mentally ill, and children.366 As the century progressed, the
Commonwealth centralized the administration of these institutions.
367
As children were valued more and more for their "distinctive attrib-
utes-impressionability, vulnerability, innocence-that required a warm,
protected, and prolonged period of nurture, ' 368 and less and less for their
potential for making immediate economic contributions to society,369
state mechanisms shifted toward providing suitable family environments
for children. Although the state established a school in 1867 that would
362. See, e.g., ANDREWS, COMMUNITY INDUSTRIES, supra note 6, at 261 (attributing the
isolation of Shakers to "the institutional care of children by the state"); ANDREWS, WORK AND
WORSHIP, supra note 9, at 208 (stating that although Shakers were able to maintain their numbers
by the adoption of orphans, "the establishment of orphanages and good schools" decreased the
numbers available to them); HORGAN, supra note 2, at xx ("One of the great sources of recruitment
to the Shaker ranks withered on the vine as town and county orphan asylums removed a pool of
youngsters which had once filled the believers' Children's Orders.").
A slightly different explanation is offered by Desroche. He indicates that Shakers were no longer
able to attract young people to communities because economic competition forced them to curtail
their social services. See DESROCHE, supra note 5, at 99, 113.
363. Teitelbaum, Family History, supra note 109, at 1156.
364. ld at 1168.
365. See 2 GRACE ABBoI-, THE CHILD AND THE STATE 9 (1938).
366. See KATZ, IN THE SHADOW, supra note 300, at 85, 109.
367. See id. at 86.
368. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED 5
(1977).
369. See KATZ, IN THE SHADOW, supra note 300, at 115-21.
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educate a poor child, the school was thought of as a temporary home
until "a good Massachusetts family" could be found to serve as a foster
family.37° Next, in 1879 and in 1887, the state passed legislation that
forbade cities and towns from keeping children in almshouses, and
required that the overseers of the poor take affirmative steps to place
children in "respectable famil[ies]" in the state.371 "Between 1876 and
1900, the proportion of all Massachusetts's juvenile state charges in insti-
tutions had dropped from 51 percent to 15 percent.
3 72
The goals of child care reforms did not necessarily conflict with the
practices of Shakers; on the contrary, some states tried to establish their
own versions of "utopian" rural communities to remove dependent chil-
dren from the influence of urban poverty and industry. 73 Nor were
Shakers necessarily disqualified from gaining temporary access to chil-
dren as foster parents.374 The cumulative effect, however, of an increased
level of state involvement in child care and protection undermined the
ability of Shakers to continue to attract children.
These developments suggest some observations about social structures
that are hidden by histories of doctrinal changes that ignore the context
in which the doctrine is applied. First, the Shakers' occasional success in
meeting judicially-imposed tests in child custody cases implies that the
law did not reflect or promote a uniform vision of the family. Nine-
teenth-century judges tolerated some measure of pluralism in the family
structures they indirectly supported by their custody decisions. Second,
because the Shaker cases require us to acknowledge that nineteenth-cen-
tury families took a variety of different forms, we can separate concern
for child welfare from the model of the modern family that arose in the
nineteenth century and has remained forceful in this era. Any number of
family models, and not just the one that emerged at the end of the nine-
teenth century, should satisfy a court's "best interests" analysis.
370. See Fifth Annual Report of the Board of State Charities of Massachusetts, January, 1869,
Pub. Doc. No. 17, in ABBOTT, supra note 365, at 58.
371. An Act Forbidding the Detention of Poor Children in Almshouses, 1879 Mass. Acts, ch.
103, in ABBOTT, supra note 365, at 42; see also An Act Extending to Towns the Provisions of the
Law Requiring Cities to Place Their Pauper Children in Families or Asylums, 1893 Mass. Acts, ch.
197, in id. at 43. Both acts allowed children to be placed either in asylums or with families, but the
former was the more widespread practice. Id at 9.
372. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW, supra note 300, at 120 (citation omitted).
373. See DELONE, supra note 110, at 54-55 (1979); Katz, Public Education, supra note 251, at 96
(describing a proposal to transport New York's "street urchins to the West as an alternative to their
institutionalization").
374. But cf Weisbrod, Family Church and State, supra note 240, at 760-62 (describing the
persuasiveness of the arguments made by nineteenth-century religious leaders to encourage the
matching of children to institutions or families of their religion); see also Lee Friedman, The
Parental Right to Control the Religious Education of a Child, 29 HARV. L. REV. 485, 498 (describing
Massachusetts laws of 1904 and 1905 which limited the indiscriminate placing of children in
religious surroundings that differed from their own); 1904 Mass. Acts, ch. 363 (requiring that
trustees of state schools "bind out children in families or homes of the religious belief of such
children" unless doing so would be impracticable); 1905 Mass. Acts, ch. 464 (granting a minor child
in the care of the state the right to "the free exercise of the religion of his parents").
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The history of the Shakers' interaction with family law also demon-
strates the unpredictability of legal doctrine. The Shaker example shows
that the pluralism initially fostered by the "best interests" analysis in
child custody litigation disappeared with them. Would the Shakers have
been better off if they had not been successful in courts? Perhaps if they
had not retained custody under a doctrine that enhanced children's wel-
fare, they would still be a viable religious group; or, perhaps they would
have died a slower death.
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